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CONSTITUTION NOTWITHSTANDING: THE
POLITICAL ILLEGITIMACY OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
Steven H. Jupiter*
Introduction
The United States Constitution sometimes allows for ugly things.
Through the years, the Supreme Court has occasionally permitted
intuitively impermissible practices, such as racism,' sexism,
2
homophobia,3 and xenophobia,4 because it found no objection
within the four corners of the Constitution. While the Court recog-
nizes most of these practices as constitutionally offensive today, it
is usually the Justices' perspectives that have changed, rather than
the Constitution's text.5 The death penalty has suffered the Court's
ideological vagaries as well. It has been felled, revived and revised
by a succession of benches whose politics have shifted with the arri-
val of every new Justice.6
Unlike many other controversial practices, however, there is ex-
plicit textual authorization of the death penalty within the Consti-
tution. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person.., shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University, 1997; B.A., Brandeis University, 1990.
The author would like to thank Professors James Fleming, Robert Kaczorowski, and
Benjamin Zipursky for their help during the drafting of this Comment.
1. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (finding the separate-but-
equal doctrine of racial segregation permissible under the Equal Protection Clause).
2. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908) (finding that the "difference
between the sexes" justified limits on the number of hours women may work).
3. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (finding permissible the pro-
hibition of homosexual sodomy between consenting adults in private).
4. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944), reh'g denied, 324
U.S. 885 (1945) (finding permissible the internment of Japanese-Americans during
World War II).
5. Language that at one time allowed racial segregation, for example, was found
by a later bench to forbid it. Plessy was overruled by Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954), in which the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
forbade the separate-but-equal doctrine.
6. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam) (effec-
tively invalidating all death penalty schemes as violating due process); Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (finding death penalty constitutional once again); Proffit
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976) (same); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)
(same). For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 55-68 and accompanying
text.
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law."7 The implication of this clause is unambiguous: it is not be-
yond our government's power to take a citizen's life if the govern-
ment meets certain standards of "due process."'8 Because there is
explicit authorization of the death penalty within the Constitution,
blanket challenges 9 to the constitutionality of capital punishment
can prevail only if they demonstrate an inherent, irremediable con-
tradiction between governmental execution and another clause or
principle, such as due process itself, equal protection, or cruel and
unusual punishment.
Challenges to the constitutionality of capital punishment, how-
ever, succeed only as appeals to the Justices' own political philoso-
phies. As the Constitution prescribes no methodology for its own
interpretation, the Court has broad discretion in making "sense" of
the text and applying it to the issues at hand. Judiciary and laity
alike understand "due process," "equal protection," and "cruel and
unusual punishment" through idiosyncratic filters, rendering these
principles susceptible of inconsistent application over time. Aboli-
tion'0 of the death penalty through judicial mandate will last only
as long as the tenures of politically sympathetic Justices.
The fact that the government has the constitutional authority to,
enact the death penalty does not necessarily mean that every juris-
diction will do so, but capital punishment is experiencing a renais-
sance of sorts. 1995 saw a record number of executions
nationwide." The death penalty has become a mantra of politi-
cians and a rallying cry of the electorate.' 2 Thirty-eight states,13 the
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. Members of the Supreme Court have explicitly acknowledged the textual au-
thorization of the death penalty within the Fifth Amendment. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at
177 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
9. "Blanket challenges" denotes those challenges that seek to abolish the death
penalty altogether rather than to vacate only a particular sentence. Every appeal
from a capital sentence does not necessarily intend to make such sweeping changes in
the law.
10. The terms "abolition" and "abolitionist" herein refer to the movement to abol-
ish the death penalty and not to their more common usages with respect to slavery.
11. There were fifty-six executions nationwide in 1995, breaking the previous an-
nual record of thirty-eight, set in 1993. See James Brooke, Utah Debates Firing
Squads in Clash of Past and Present, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1996, at 16; Man Executed
for 1978 Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at A18. The National Coalition to Abol-
ish the Death Penalty predicts an increase to 100 executions in 1996. Brooke, supra.
12. See, e.g., Dan Morain, Governor OK's Vote to Expand Executions, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1995, at A3; Doris Sue Wong, Governor Refiles Bill for Death Penalty: Says
"Moral Consensus" Favors Its Reinstatement, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 1995, at 15;
Maria Newman, Vacco Savors Victory as a Mandate for the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 1994, at B16; Ian Fisher, Clamor over Death Penalty Dominates Debate on
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, at 45.
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District of Columbia, and the federal government all currently
have death-penalty provisions in their criminal codes. 14 The re-
newed popular appeal of the death penalty has triggered extensive
public discourse. 15 The public debates have tended, though, to fo-
cus on only three aspects of the death penalty: penological, ethical,
and religious. While all these arguments are valid in their own
right, the public debate has.ignored the specifically political impli-
cations of the death penalty.
"Political," in this context, is used to describe those implications
of capital punishment relating to the structure and authority of
government. 16 Penological arguments, in contrast, treat the practi-
cal effects of capital punishment, such as deterrence, public safety
and cost-benefit analyses. 7 Ethical arguments involve questions of
13. Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mex-
ico, New York, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming.
14. New York State, long one of the most stalwart hold-outs, recently reinstated
capital punishment, riding the resurgent wave of popular demand. See James Dao,
Death Penalty in New York Is Reinstated after 18 Years: Pataki Sees Justice Served,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al. Massachusetts, another state with a long history of
legislative opposition to the death penalty, has recently come close to reinstating capi-
tal punishment. See Peter J. Howe, Senate Votes to Restore Capital Punishment, Bos-
TON GLOBE, May 24, 1995, at 26. The federal government under President Clinton
has also broadened the scope of its death penalty, now encompassing crimes such as
child pornography and civil rights offenses, among many others. See Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. 6, 108 Stat. 1959 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3591-3598 (1995)).
15. See, e.g., David A. Kaplan, Anger and Ambivalence, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1995,
at 25; Jack Greenberg, Perspective on the Death Penalty, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 1995, at
B5; Mike Royko, Sobering Thoughts on the Death Penalty, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 1995,
at 3; With Death Penalty, Less Is More, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 12, 1995, at 2; David Nyhan,
The Cost of Death Penalty - It's a Killer, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 1995, at 23; Fred
Bruning, Feeling Good about the Death Penalty, NEWSDAY, Mar. 1, 1995, at B4.
16. There is certainly some overlap among these different species of argument, but
"political" is used in this Comment to describe those arguments that do not draw their
force from religious beliefs or tenets, are not concerned mainly with the fairness of
the death penalty as a practice, and which are not preoccupied with whether the death
penalty does the job it is "supposed" to do. Penological and ethical arguments take
for granted that capital punishment is within the government's sphere of political
power; it is the particular manifestation that is problematic. That is, if the death pen-
alty were an effective crime-stopper, cheaper, capable of accurate, fair, and consistent
application, then most penological and ethical arguments against it would lose their
steam. The salience of political arguments, however, would not diminish. If the gov-
ernment does not have the power to impose capital punishment as a matter of struc-
ture and vested authority, no perfection of technique or effect can rectify the problem.
17. There are several "classic" bases for punishment: deterrence, retribution, reha-
bilitation and incapacitation. Rehabilitation is obviously irrelevant to the present dis-
1996]
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arbitrariness, racial and economic prejudices and retribution.18
Religious arguments raise issues of religious propriety. 19 These ar-
guments, however, do not address the most basic problem of capi-
tal punishment: the source of the government's power to execute.
Instead of asking whether the death penalty is effective in its osten-
cussion because a dead criminal cannot be reformed. Incapacitation, in its severest
manifestation, has also been invoked to justify the death penalty. It has been argued
that if someone is a continued and incorrigible danger to society, the state ought not
expend resources to maintain him or her in prison because the person is not "worth"
the effort and expense. Capital punishment, it is claimed, is a cheaper alternative.
However, it is usually less expensive to maintain someone in prison for life than to
prosecute a capital case through all phases of appeal. Cost-benefit analyses of capital
punishment tip in favor of abolition. Incapacitation is not a major argument in the
death-penalty debate and does not warrant extended discussion here. "Moral educa-
tion" has also been suggested as a justification for punishment. See Jean Hampton,
The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 208 (1984). Ac-
cording to this theory, "punishment sends a message to criminals, giving moral rea-
sons as to why they should not behave in the ways which have occasioned the
punishments." Lisa Anne Smith, The Moral Reform Theory of Punishment, 37 ARIZ.
L. REV. 197, 197 (1995). This theory is also inapplicable to capital punishment be-
cause even if the wrongdoer learns his or her "lesson," there is no opportunity to put
this new understanding into effect.
18. For a detailed analysis of the ethical arguments against the death penalty, see
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE
AND MISTAKE (1974). Black argues that "mistake and arbitrariness in death-penalty
cases ... are not fringe problems, susceptible to being mopped up by minor refine-
ments in concept and technique, but are at the very heart of the matter and are insolu-
ble by any methods now known or now foreseeable." Id. at 9-10. However, see infra
Part I for a discussion of the Supreme Court's apparent rejection of Black's claim.
19. Not all religious arguments oppose capital punishment. The Bible, particularly
the Old Testament, condones the death penalty in several places. For example, Exo-
dus states: "He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall surely be put to death." Exo-
dus 21:12. There are also politics-minded religious arguments for capital punishment.
See, e.g., Thomas J. Riley, The Right of the State to Inflict Capital Punishment, 6
CATH. LAWYER 279 (1960). Riley argues:
Only God, Who created human life, has the right to take it away. Since,
however, the authority of the state derives ultimately.from God, and is exer-
cised in God's name, it is not inconsistent to hold that the state may claim
the right, in the name of God, to take away human life in circumstances in
which this would appear clearly to be in accord with God's own will.
Id. at 280. The circumstances under which government execution accords with
"God's will," in Riley's view, are those where "a man, through his own fault, has
endangered the right of the state to carry on its appointed functions," which are to
protect citizens from the harm of others. Id. So the death penalty is divinely man-
dated for "criminal attack which endangers [society's] very foundations." Id. First-
degree murder is the only crime which Riley specifically enumerates, but he believes
the death penalty is justified for all crimes of "serious proportions." Id. at 281. Riley
does not offer any clearer criteria than that and it is difficult, using his analysis, to
know which crimes offend "God's will" and thus merit the death penalty. His larger
point regarding the religious propriety of the death penalty is beyond the scope of
academic critique because it is a matter of faith, though it is, of course, open to criti-
cism on religious grounds.
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sible purposes, or whether it is fairly or properly imposed, the pub-
lic ought to ask whether the government should, or does, have the
power to impose the death penalty at all, regardless of the pen-
alty's status in the judiciary.
"Constitutional" is not a synonym for "good" or "just."2 For
example, if the Supreme Court determined that the Constitution
did not prevent a state from prohibiting the administration of first
aid, the Court would have no authority to override such a prohibi-
tion and declare the medical procedures legal. Nevertheless, the
public would surely raise an eyebrow at the legitimacy of such a
prohibition, despite the Court's tolerance of it. Similarly, a judicial
designation of "constitutional" ought not quell public unrest re-
garding the legitimacy of the death penalty.2 ' The broader political
implications of capital punishment cast serious doubts on its place
in our system of constitutional democracy. Specifically, capital
punishment raises fundamental questions about the proper role of
the government, the source of the government's authority and the
rights of the individual.
This Comment argues that the death penalty is inconsistent with
underlying principles of American democracy and is thus illegiti-
20. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893). Thayer claimed that judicial deter-
minations of "constitutionality" find only that there is no contradiction between chal-
lenged legislation and the text of the Constitution. Such findings say nothing about
the worth or desirability of the legislation. Id. at 135. But see ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). Bickel argued that the Supreme
Court's designation of "constitutional" indeed lends an air of "prestige" and legiti-
macy to legislation "that may have been tentative in the conception or that [is] on the
verge of abandonment in the execution." Id. at 129. In not invalidating legislation as
unconstitutional, the Court is saying that the challenged law is consonant with "the
principles whose integrity the Court is charged with maintaining" and that such con-
sonance "is something." Id. Such arguments, though, (1) assume the righteousness of
the Court's positions and ignore the possibility that the Justices may be motivated by
forces other than justice itself, and (2) assume that the "principles" of the Constitu-
tion, as expounded by the Supreme Court, are themselves inherently worthy of
unquestioning respect and reverence. These are assumptions which this Comment
rejects. See infra Part II for further development of this line of argument.
21. For a discussion of the judiciary's role in shaping American political life, see
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 123-161 (1993). Sunstein argues
that "the courts should usually be reluctant to intrude into politics." Id. at 123. For
Sunstein, excessive judicial activism usurps the role of the citizen in what he calls our
"deliberative democracy" because it leaves all questions of constitutionality to the
courts, more specifically to the insular Supreme Court, whereas Sunstein believes
these questions are more rightly decided through inclusive public deliberation. Id. at
133-35. The Constitution, in Sunstein's view, is not an internal memo passed among
the Justices in their chambers, but rather a public document demanding public
interpretation.
1996]
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mate as a matter of political philosophy, despite its conceded con-
stitutionality.22 Part I analyzes the Supreme Court's idiosyncratic
treatment of challenges to capital punishment on grounds of due
process, equal protection and cruel and unusual punishment, dem-
onstrating the unreliability of such challenges. Part II examines in
detail the death penalty's political implications for the American
system of democracy and why those implications render capital
punishment illegitimate in our society.23 Part III discusses the role
of the political process in the abolition of the death penalty. This
Comment concludes that the death penalty ought to be rejected as
a matter of political philosophy and that permanent abolition can-
not be achieved through the traditional courtroom attacks. Lasting
repeal of death penalty provisions can be realized only through a
critical re-evaluation of the proper role of government and by leg-
islative and popular commitment to those principles.
I. The Death Penalty and the Constitution
The Supreme Court began only recently to question the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty. Before the Civil War, the Court
rarely considered challenges to the death penalty based on the fed-
eral constitution.24 Constitutional challenges to the death penalty
have relied upon three grounds: (1) due process; (2) equal protec-
tion; and (3) cruel and unusual punishment. None has succeeded
in permanently abolishing capital punishment as a nationwide
practice because such challenges cannot overcome the powerful
combination of explicit textual authorization and idiosyncratic judi-
cial review.
A. Due Process
The Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments provide that the government may not deprive any person of
22. This Comment deals only with the legitimacy of capital punishment in the
American system of constitutional democracy. It makes no claims regarding the legit-
imacy of capital punishment in other political systems. There may be valid penologi-
cal, ethical, and religious arguments for and against capital punishment in those
systems, but the political arguments laid out herein are intended to apply only to the
United States.
23. "Illegitimate" is not the same as "unjust." "Illegitimate" is a political designa-
tion whereas "unjust" is an ethical one. Death may, in some people's minds, be just
deserts for certain crimes and still be an illegitimate punishment in a particular polit-
ical system.
24. Stephen R. McAllister, The Problem of Implementing a Constitutional System
of Capital Punishment, 43 KAN. L. REv. 1039, 1044 (1995).
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life, liberty, or property without "due process of law." 5 These
clauses prohibit the federal and state governments from behaving
arbitrarily and capriciously. Due process, in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, has evolved into two distinct species: procedural and
substantive. Procedural due process, as its name suggests, guaran-
tees fair process in all dealings between the government and the
citizenry. Procedural rights guaranteed under the Due Process
Clause include many in the area of criminal law, such as the right
of a defendant to obtain exculpatory evidence gathered by the
prosecution 26 and the right not to be convicted of a crime except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.2 7
Substantive due process, by contrast, "incorporat[es] a general
mandate to review the substantive merits of legislative and other
governmental action" rather than merely evaluate the fairness or
necessity of a particular procedure. 8 Under this application of due
process, the Supreme Court may strike down legislation that does
not violate any explicit constitutional provision but nevertheless of-
fends certain unenumerated substantive rights that are integral to
the American political scheme. 29  Examples of unenumerated
rights that have been protected under the Court's substantive due
process jurisprudence include the rights to contract, 30 abortion,3'
contraception,32 and educational choice.33 None of these rights has
explicit textual support in the Constitution, but the Court was will-
25. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
26. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). "[T]he suppression by the prose-
cution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment." Id. at 87.
27. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). "[W]e explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged." Id. at 364.
28. JOHN HART ELY,'DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 15 (1980).
29. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (stating that the Due Pro-
cess Clause protects only those substantive rights deemed "fundamental" and "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
30. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that the Due Process
Clause protects a citizen's right to form contracts). Lochner was expressly overruled
by West Coast Hotel, Inc. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), in which the Court held that
there was no fundamental right to contract under the Constitution.
31. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause
protects a woman's right to abortion during the first six months of pregnancy).
32. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the Due Process
Clause protects all citizens' right to use contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects married couples' right
to use contraceptives).
33. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the Due
Process Clause protects the right of parents to send their children to private schools);
1996]
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ing to infer their existence from other constitutional provisions and
historical practices. Because substantive due process allows courts
considerable legal flexibility - it allows them to recognize rights
that arguably have no basis in the Constitution - it has not been
universally embraced as a valid exercise of the judiciary's power.34
Substantive due process, however, is not relevant to the Court's
capital jurisprudence. As the text of the Constitution allows gov-
ernmental infringment of a citizen's right to live,35 there is no need,
or authority, for the Court to inquire whether such a power is be-
yond the government's scope. The inquiry then progresses along
procedural lines: whether the death penalty is being fairly and
properly imposed. In the first due process challenges to the death
penalty, though, the Supreme Court "interpreted the Constitution
to impose virtually no restraints on the states' administration of
their capital punishment systems. 36
In Francis v. Resweber,37 for example, the Court rejected the due
process challenge of a death row inmate who had suffered a failed
attempt at electrocution in Louisiana and was scheduled for an-
other round in the chair. He claimed that a second attempt would
violate the Due Process Clause because it would put him twice in
jeopardy of his life and would offend the cruel and unusual punish-
ment provision of the Eighth Amendment.38 The Court rejected
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects
the right of parents to teach their children foreign languages).
34. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 981 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's liberal application of
substantive due process leads it toward "systematically eliminating checks upon its
own power..."); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that when the Court applies the Due Process Clause to the substance of legisla-
tion, "our Nation ceases to be governed according to the 'law of the land' and instead
becomes one governed ultimately by the 'law of the judges' "); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 32 (1990) ("[T]he Supreme Court will not abandon the
notion [of substantive due process], despite demonstrations of its utter illegitimacy,
precisely because it is an ever flowing fount of judicial power."); ELY, supra note 28,
at 19 ("[T]he proper function of the Due Process Clause ... [is] that of guaranteeing
fair procedures.").
35. The Fifth Amendment permits the government to execute citizens. It requires
only that the government act in accordance with notions of "due process." See supra
notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
36. McAllister, supra note 24, at 1045.
37. 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947).
38. Id. at 461. At the time Francis was decided, the Court had not yet held that
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments was applica-
ble to the states. Accordingly, Francis was decided under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifically targets the states, even though the
issue - cruel and unusual punishment - was facially an Eighth Amendment
question.
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the claim by stating: "Accidents happen for which no man is to
blame. '39 The significance of Francis lies in the Court's refusal to
consider whether electrocution itself violated due process. Instead,
it relied on a nineteenth-century case, In re Kemmler,4 ° in which it
had found electrocution constitutionally permissible. That the
Court was willing to rely on fifty-year-old precedent in a case that
demanded consideration of current mores suggests a lack of judi-
cial interest in capital punishment at that time.4'
In Solesbee v. Balkcom,42 the Court allowed Georgia's governor
to continue to appoint physicians to evaluate the sanity of death-
row inmates for purposes of granting stays of execution. The in-
mate in Solesbee claimed that such appointments deprived him of
due process by preventing him from consulting his own doctors and
presenting his own evidence at a hearing. 3 The Court held that it
did not offend due process for a state "to deem its Governor an
'apt and special tribunal' to pass upon" a defendant's sanity."
Such delegation of power, the Court stated, was in keeping with
Anglo-American legal traditions. 5
In later due process cases, the Court began to set higher stan-
dards for governmental action. In a 1968 case, United States v.
Jackson,46 the Court invalidated that part of the Federal Kidnap-
ping Act 47 (the "Act") leaving the imposition of the death penalty
to the jury's discretion while laying out no procedure for its imposi-
tion on a defendant who either waived the right to a jury trial or
pled guilty.48 The Act exposed a defendant to risk of death only
upon assertion of her constitutional right to trial by jury. The
39. Id. at 462.
40. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
41. Under the Court's "cruel and unusual" jurisprudence, the Court must make
moral determinations regarding the current social status of the challenged practices.
See infra Part I.C. for an extended discussion of the Court's role under the Eighth
Amendment. For a more detailed analysis of electrocution specifically, see Deborah
W. Denno, Is Electrocution an Unconstitutional Method of Execution? The Engineer-
ing of Death over the Century, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 551 (1994) (arguing that
contemporary scientific knowledge of electrocution's physical effects and the fre-
quency of "botched" attempts ought to render it unacceptable under the Eighth
Amendment).
42. 339 U.S. 9, 13-14 (1950).
43. Id at 8.
44. Id. at 12 (quoting Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897)).
45. Id. For further discussion of the propriety of government-conducted psychiat-
ric examinations in capital cases, see Welsh S. White, Government Psychiatric Exami-
nations and the Death Penalty, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 869 (1995).
46. 390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
48. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 571.
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Court held that the Act's procedural inconsistency imposed an
"impermissible burden" on the accused in violation of due process
because it forced her to choose between possible death and the
guaranteed right to jury trial. 9 In another 1968 case, Witherspoon
v. Illinois,50 the Court held that it was unconstitutional for Illinois
to exclude from murder trials potential jurors who professed oppo-
sition to the death penalty, stating that the death penalty could not
be imposed by "hanging juries" and still "be squared with the Con-
stitution."' The Court held that Illinois had "stacked the deck"
against the defendant by seating only those potential jurors who
were in favor of capital punishment.52
These two groups of cases - the earlier, more deferential ones
and the later, more stringent ones - were decided by largely the
same two assemblages of Justices.53 As the overall political tem-
perament of the Justices shifted from deference to the legislatures
in matters of criminal law to increasing skepticism of the govern-
ment's commitment to "due process," the holdings of the Court
followed suit.54 There should be no surprise in the consistency of a
49. Id. at 572.
50. 391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968).
51. Id. The Witherspoon Court held that prospective jurors in capital cases could
be struck for cause if the jurors made it unmistakably clear "(1) that they would auto-
matically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without any regard to any
evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their
attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial deci-
sion as to the defendant's guilt." Id. at 522 n. 21. In 1985, however, the Court relaxed
the Witherspoon standard by ruling that the prosecution no longer needed to prove
with "unmistakable clarity" that a juror would "automatically" vote against the death
penalty. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-25 (1985). The new standard is
"whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " Id. at 424
(footnote omitted).
52. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523.
53. From 1947-1950, the bench comprised Fred M. Vinson, Hugo L. Black, Stanley
Reed, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, Frank Murphy, Robert H. Jackson,
Wiley Rutledge, Harold H. Burton, Tom C. Clark, and Sherman Minton. The latter
two replaced Rutledge and Murphy. In 1968, the Court included Earl Warren, Hugo
L. Black, William 0. Douglas, John M. Harlan, William J. Brennan, Jr., Potter Stew-
art, Byron R. White, Abe Fortas, and Thurgood Marshall.
54. It is also significant that the later cases were decided by the Warren Court,
which earned a reputation for its protective stance toward the procedural rights of
criminal defendants. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1978).
[The Warren Court] reformed numerous aspects of state and federal crimi-
nal procedure, significantly enhancing the rights of the accused, including
juvenile offenders; it held that wire-tapping and eavesdropping are subject to
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and that evidence obtained in violation of that prohibition may not
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particular bench's holdings, but inconsistent notions of "due pro-
cess" from one bench to another highlight the weaknesses in-such
courtroom attacks on the death penalty. Ideological shifting is es-
pecially jarring when it occurs with very little change in the Court's
composition.
The Burger Court, for example, experienced a swift turn-around
regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment. In 1971, the
Burger Court decided McGautha v. California,55 in which it upheld
California and Ohio laws permitting juries to impose the death
penalty without any judicial or statutory guidance. The convicted
defendants claimed that the juries' unfettered discretion violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.56 The
Court, however, stated: "Despite the undeniable surface appeal of
the proposition, we conclude that the courts below properly re-
jected it."'57 The Court noted that the same challenge had been
brought in many federal and state courts and no court had ever
found it to possess any merit.5 Furthermore, the Court asserted
that jury discretion in capital cases was an established legal tradi-
tion.59 "In light of history, experience, and the present limitations
of human knowledge," the Court stated, "[it is] impossible to say
be admitted in state or federal trials; and it laid down a whole set of new
rules governing the admissibility of confessions, and, in effect, the conduct of
police throughout the country toward persons arrested on suspicion of
crime.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The Warren Court did, however, reject some due process claims early on. In Wil-
liams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), for example, the defendant had kidnapped
and murdered an Oklahoma man and had been convicted separately of the two
crimes. He received life imprisonment for the former and the death penalty for the
latter. Id. at 587. The Court held that it did not violate due process for the trial court
to take the murder into account as an aggravating factor when determining the sen-
tence for the kidnapping conviction. Id. at 586-87. In fact, no Supreme Court bench
has ever held on any ground that it is unconstitutional to impose the death penalty for
felony-murder. Felony-murder seems to be a "growth area" in capital punishment.
The federal government has recently added to a host of serious federal crimes capital
punishment provisions that are triggered by even the unintentional killing of someone
during the commission 'thereof. See Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, supra note 14.
55. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
56. Id. at 196.
57. Id. (footnote omitted).
58. Id at 203.
59. Id. at 199-201. The Court cited to Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948),
in which it had found unconstitutional a jury instruction that conferred upon capital
juries total discretion as to sentencing, and to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968), in which it had forbidden Illinois to seat in capital juries only prospective
jurors who supported the death penalty. For a more detailed discussion of Wither-
spoon, see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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that ... untrammeled [jury] discretion ... in capital cases is offen-
sive to anything in the Constitution. '60
In Furman v. Georgia,61 decided the very next year, the Court
found unconstitutional the capital punishment procedures of Geor-
gia and Texas, which, like those at issue in McGautha, also left
solely to jury discretion whether a convicted defendant should re-
ceive death or imprisonment.62 In several opinions, the Justices
gave varied reasons for invalidating the procedures, including arbi-
trariness,63 the potential for racial discrimination,64 and its per-
ceived inherent cruelty.65 The composition of the bench had
changed somewhat from the year before, with Justices Powell and
Rehnquist replacing Justices Harlan and Black, but seven of the
nine McGautha Justices were still sitting on the Court. Furman ef-
fectively invalidated all discretionary capital punishment schemes,
not just those of Georgia and Texas.66 In response, thirty-five
states, including Georgia and Texas, adapted their death penalty
provisions to accommodate the Court's expressed concerns about
unlimited jury discretion.67 In 1976, the Court upheld three of the
revamped schemes as no longer constitutionally offensive.68
60. McGautha, 402 U.S. at 207.
61. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
62. The Court decided Furman on both Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment (due process) grounds.
63. Furman, 408 U.S. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring). The high service rendered
by the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment is to require
legislatures to write penal laws that are even-handed, nonselective, and nonarbitrary,
and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selec-
tively, and spottily to unpopular groups.
Id.
64. Id. at 366 (Marshall, J., concurring). It is the poor, and the members of minor-
ity groups who are least able to voice their complaints against capital punishment.
Their impotence leaves them victims of a sanction that the wealthier, better-repre-
sented, just-as-guilty person can escape. So long as the capital sanction is used only
against the forlorn, easily forgotten members of society, legislators are content to
maintain the status quo, because change would draw attention to the problem and
concern might develop. Ignorance is perpetuated and apathy soon becomes its mate
.... Id.
65. Id. at 287 (Brennan, J., concurring). "Death today is an unusually severe pun-
ishment, unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing
punishment is comparable to death in terms of physical and mental suffering." Id.
66. All capital punishment schemes at that time granted juries the discretion to
impose or withhold the death penalty.
67. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-180 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Pow-
ell, and Stevens, JJ.).
68. Id. at 207; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 277 (1976). It is not the goal of this Part to examine individually each Justice's
rationales, or to examine the Court's capital jurisprudence in toto, only to demon-
strate the inherent instability of the Court's determinations with regard to capital
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Due process cannot permanently resolve questions of the death
penalty's legitimacy.69 The Due Process Clause's literal protections
against procedural abuses or failures are curative by nature. Be-
cause the text of the Due Process Clause allows the government to
deprive a citizen of life under certain circumstances,7 ° the courts
may consider only whether the criminal justice system has failed a
particular defendant or whether a particular statutory scheme is in-
capable of fair application. Though it may be relatively easy to
demonstrate a single instance of procedural failure, it is prohibi-
tively difficult to prove that there is absolutely no feasible process
punishment. For more detailed analyses of the Court's capital jurisprudence, see
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355
(1995); McAllister, supra note 24; Michael Mello, Adhering to Our Views: Justices
Brennan and Marshall and the Relentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 591 (1995); MARK TUSHNET, THE DEATH PENALTY (1994); Samuel J.
M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment A Critique of the Political and Philosophical
Thought of the Justices' Positions, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1992); Stephen Reinhardt,
The Supreme Court, the Death Penalty and the Harris Case, 102 YALE L.J. 205 (1992);
Diane Wells, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty: A Need for a Return to
the Principles of Furman, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 427 (1989); Robert A. Burt,
Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1741
(1987); and Michael W. Combs, The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment. Uncer-
tainty, Ambiguity, and Judicial Control, 7 S. U. L. REV. 1 (1980).
Justice Blackmun has openly bemoaned the Court's unstable capital jurisprudence.
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 410 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (objecting
to the "suddenness of the Court's perception of progress in the human attitude" to-
ward capital punishment during the year between Furman and McGautha); Calins v.
Collins, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1127, 1131 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (calling the
Burger Court's "abrupt change of position" toward capital punishment "objectiona-
ble"). For a detailed discussion of Justice Blackmun's attitude toward the death pen-
alty, see Randall Coyne, Marking the Progress of a Humane Justice: Harry
Blackmun's Death Penalty Epiphany, 43 KAN. L. REV. 367 (1995).
69. Commentators have also lamented that "[t]he due process romanticism of the
[capital punishment] trial has enabled us to to avoid acknowledging the inevitably
unsystematic, irreducibly personal moral elements of the choice to administer the
death penalty." Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305, 393
(1983). The apparent objectivity of "due process" offers "the illusion of a legal rule,
so that no actor at any point in the penalty procedure need feel he has chosen to kill
any individual." Id. The danger here is that the law will allow government officials
and jurors to escape what would be, in any other setting, the crushing moral weight of
imposing a death sentence. They need not address the morality of their actions be-
cause the law has already exonerated them. In a sense, this echoes the "Nuremberg"
defense: that one was "just following orders." If the law permits such acts, the public
often assumes that those acts are just or moral or that they have a duty to comply with
the law without any consideration of its legitimacy. See Randy E. Barnett, Getting
Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 93, 102-03 (1995) (noting that people often impute morality and justice to
"legal norms" rather than conduct independent evaluations of a law's legitimacy).
70. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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by which a jurisdiction can fairly impose the death penalty under
any circumstances. 71 A state may save its flawed death penalty
scheme by curing whatever procedural ill the courts have found
therein, as shown by the swift remedial actions of Georgia and
Texas following McGautha.72
B. Equal Protection
. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state "shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."'73 Under this clause, the government is required to treat
similarly-situated persons equally.74 Arguably enacted to protect
only racial minorities, most particularly African-Americans, 7 the
Equal Protection Clause is now seen as a general mandate of
equality for all persons. Nevertheless, the courts still provide the
greatest relief under the clause to racial, religious, and ethnic
groups. 76
71. It has been argued, though, that the Due Process Clause mandates a "pre-
sumption of life" analagous to the recognized "presumption of innocence." See, Note,
The Presumption of Life: A Starting Point for a Due Process Analysis of Capital Sen-
tencing, 94 YALE L. J. 351 (1984). This presumption of life "guarantees a convicted
defendant the right to live incarcerated for life unless the prosecution demonstrates
beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the only appropriate penalty for the defend-
ant." Id. at 353. In theory, such a notion could preclude all imposition of the death
penalty because life imprisonment without parole achieves many of the "rational"
goals of execution, such as deterrence and incapacitation. However, it cannot con-
tend with society's powerful emotional and psychological need for retribution. If a
defendant were convicted of raping and murdering several children, for example, it
would be unrealistic to expect jurors to set aside their moral outrage in deciding
whether to execute or imprison. Imprisonment may prevent the defendant from com-
mitting additional rapes and murders, but it would not satisfy many people's desire
for vengeance. Given the choice to execute in such circumstances, many jurors would
probably vote to do so, even if every "rational" penological goal could be achieved
through imprisonment.
72. For a refutation of this claim, see BLACK, supra note 18. Black claims that no
matter the scheme or procedure, there will always be an unacceptably great risk of
error and an inevitable measure of caprice in capital punishment.
73. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
74. While the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies in
its terms only to the states, the Court has held that its principles apply to the federal
government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (forbidding "separate-but-equal" public schooling in
the District of Columbia).
75. The original purpose of the Equal Protection Clause has been a matter of de-
bate, although in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Thirteenth and Fifteenth, had "one per-
vading purpose ... the freedom of, the slave race . . . ." Id. at 71.
76. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982) (invalidating Texas law preventing
children of illegal immigrants from attending public school). The courts use three
types of test to determine the constitutionality of a challenged statute or practice:
1996] CONSTITUTION NOTWITHSTANDING
Racial equal protection challenges to the death penalty are a re-
cent innovation. The Court's first and, so far, only case brought on
these grounds, McCleskey v. Kemp,77 was decided in 1987. The
convicted defendant, a black man who had been sentenced to
death in Georgia, claimed that the state's capital punishment pro-
cedure was racially discriminatory because "persons who murder
whites are more likely to be sentenced to death than persons who
murder blacks, and black murderers are more likely to be sen-
tenced to death than white murderers. ' 78 Despite a concededly ac-
curate statistical study supporting the defendant's allegations,79 the
Court rejected the claim in a 5-4 decision.80 A majority of the
Court held that evidence of general racial disparity was not suffi-
cient to sustain a claim under the Equal Protection Clause in this
instance. The Court further required that the convicted defendant
strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, and rational basis. The courts apply the strict
scrutiny test when the statute or practice involves a "suspect class," such as racial,
religious, or ethnic groups, or impinges a fundamental right, such as free speech. This
test places the burden on the legislature "to demonstrate that its classification has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Id. The heightened
scrutiny test is applied when the statute or practice allegedly makes "quasi-suspect"
classifications, such as gender and illegitimacy. Id. Under the heightened scrutiny
test, the statute or practice need only have a "substantial" relation to an "important"
goyernmental interest. Id. at 217-18. The rational basis test is used for legislation
affecting economic or social interests and not involving a suspect or quasi-suspect
class and not infringing any fundamental rights. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retire-
ment Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). Under the rational basis test, the burden
falls to the plaintiff to prove that the government has acted in an "arbitrary and irra-
tional way" in singling out the affected group or class of people and that there is no
rational basis for the challenged statute or practice. Washington Star Co. v. Interna-
tional Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1509 (1984).
77. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
78. Id at 291 (footnote omitted).
79. The defendant relied upon "the Baldus study," which indicated that in more
than 2,000 murder cases defendants charged with killing white persons received the
death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks received
the death penalty in only 1% of the cases." The study also found that "the death
penalty was assessed in 22% of the cases involving black defendants and white vic-
tims; 8% of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 1% of the cases
involving black defendants and black victims; and 3% of the cases involving white
defendants and black victims. Similarly, [the study] found that prosecutors sought the
death penalty in 70% of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 32%
of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving
black defendants and black victims; and 19% of the cases involving white defendants
and black victims.... Thus, the Baldus study indicates that black defendants.., who
kill white victims have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty. McCles-
key, 481 U.S. at 286-87 (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 299.
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demonstrate that "the decisionmakers in his case acted with dis-
criminatory purpose. 81
Given the Court's holding in McCleskey, it is unlikely that an-
other such blanket challenge will be brought any time soon. While
a capital defendant who can prove racial discrimination in his par-
ticular case may prevail on an equal protection claim, the Court
seems unwilling to entertain sweeping challenges on racial
grounds.82 In addressing racial grievances case by case, overturn-
ing only individual sentences, the Court can preserve the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty as an institution.83
81. Id. at 292. The Court refused to infer discriminatory treatment of the defend-
ant from the broad findings of the study. Id. at 297.
82. The Supreme Court has resisted such broad-based claims of racial disparity
despite acknowledgment from Congress itself that "[t]here is compelling evidence
from certain jurisdictions that the race of a defendant may be a factor governing the
imposition of the death sentence." H.R. REP. No. 458, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1994).
83. Scholars have argued that there is an "inescapable equal protection problem"
with regard to capital punishment. ELY, supra note 28, at 176. For Ely, the theoreti-
cal impossibility of ensuring even-handed imposition of the death penalty makes judi-
cial abolition more attractive because the political process is, he asserts, inaccessible
to those disproportionately disadvantaged by death penalty statutes: racial minorities
and the poor. See also BLACK, supra note 18. However, both Ely and Black ex-
pressed these concerns before McCleskey - Ely in 1980 and Black in 1974. It is not
clear if the Court's decision took any wind out of their sails. Ely's argument seems
the more vulnerable to discredit by McCleskey. That is, he advocated resort to the
courts in cases where minorities would not be able to protect their rights through our
exclusive political process because the courts would be, he asserted, more likely to see
and redress legal inequities which the majoritarian electorate either embraced or ig-
nored. As far as capital punishment is concerned, Ely acknowledged that proven dis-
criminatory imposition thereof in Arkansas, for example, would have little to say
about the constitutionality of capital punishment in Montana, ELY, supra note 28 at
173, which is precisely the sort of logic the McCleskey Court used to reject the equal
protection claim before it. It seems, though, that Ely expected the Court to come to
an additional conclusion: that the mere possibility of invidious discrimination ought
compel invalidation, especially given the undeniable gravity of capital punishment.
Id. at 176. But the Court was unwilling to take that extra step, In fact, McCleskey
does little to boost Ely's theory that judicial activism is desirable when there are "fail-
ures of representation, in that those who make the laws (by refusing effectively to
make the laws) have provided a buffer to ensure that they and theirs will not effec-
tively be subjected to them." Id. at 177. It seemed the ideal opportunity for the
Court to champion the political underdog, but the possibility, even probability, of




C. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
1. An Eighth Amendment Overview
The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punish-
ments." 8 Although, to some, this guarantee might seem to offer
certain solace to those convicted of capital crimes, the odds of
mounting a successful judicial campaign on these grounds wax or
wane with every change in the composition of the Court. The per-
ceived "cruelty" of capital punishment has indeed prompted some
Justices to find it unconstitutional - in Furman v. Georgia,85 for
example - but, as discussed above, the ruling in Furman has not
endured.
The problem with appealing to the Eighth Amendment is that
"cruel" and "unusual" are devoid of intrinsic meaning. Their sig-
nificances derive solely from the values of those who seek to inter-
pret them. What is "cruel" to some may be "lenient" to others.
Certain punishments, such as quartering 86 or confinement in an
iron maiden,87 would likely be of universal offense. No contempo-
rary American court would uphold a sentence of quartering; no
contemporary American legislature would authorize it. But such
consensus is rare in the realities of our society. The Eighth
Amendment, then, deals with punishments that fall in the spectrum
between what is obviously too harsh and what is obviously appro-
priate. The prevalence of capital punishment in American jurisdic-
tions pushes the death penalty from an extreme to somewhere in
the middle range of acceptability. 88 In order to judge the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment, the
courts must gauge where exactly it falls within that range at the
time of their review.
The Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to prohibit exces-
sive or disproportionate sentences.89 Is death, then, an inherently
excessive penalty for all crimes, even murder? No state or federal
court has ever held that it is. The death penalty has been invali-
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
85. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
86. The practice of tying the victim's arms and legs separately to four horses and
having the animals pull in different directions.
87. A medieval torture device resembling a sarcophagus lined with spikes.
88. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) ("[I]n a day when [the death penalty]
is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of
cruelty.")
89. E.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) ("[The Eighth Amendment]
proscribes punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.") (citing
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
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dated for lesser crimes than murder,9" but never with regard to that
most serious offense. A blanket challenge on grounds of excessive-
ness would have to overcome a long-standing presumption of pro-
portionality for murder. History has always held great sway over
the Justices,91 and a claim of disproportionality would be under-
mined by the endurance of capital punishment in our society. In
jurisdictions with the death penalty, concerns about proportionality
spur statutory schemes limiting the number of capital crimes and
enumerating aggravating and mitigating factors, to ensure that only
those crimes deemed most serious are punishable by death.92 But
90. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (rape); Collins v.
State, 236 S.E.2d 759 (Ga. 1977) (armed robbery, rape, and kidnapping); Buford v.
State, 403 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1981) (sexual assault).
91. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J., con-
curring) (stating that there can be no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy because prohibitions against it have existed "throughout the history of West-
ern Civilization"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) ("[An
unbroken practice of according the [property-tax] exemption to churches ... is not
something to be lightly cast aside."); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31
(1922) ("If a thing has been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it
will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it....").
92. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 650-662 (McKinney 1995). Upon signing
New York's new death penalty into law in 1995, Governor George E. Pataki wrote:
Under this legislation, those who murder a police officer, a probation, pa-
role, court, or corrections officer, a judge, a witness or member of a witness'
family can face the death penalty. Someone who murders while already
serving life in prison or while escaping from prison, or who murders while
committing other serious felonies can face the death penalty. Contract kill-
ers, serial murderers, those who torture their victims, or those who have
murdered before can also be sentenced to death. And in determining
whether the death penalty should be imposed on anyone convicted of first-
degree murder, the [capital punishment statute] expressly authorizes juries
to hear and consider additional evidence whenever the murder was commit-
ted as part of an act of terrorism or by someone with two or more prior
serious felony convictions....
Constitutional concerns and the infirmities contained in prior New York
law are fully met in this [capital punishment statute], which establishes a
bifurcated trial procedure and sets forth clear standards to narrow the scope
of the death penalty and guide the jury in determining whether to impose
the death penalty.
Upon the conviction of a defendant for first-degree murder, a separate
sentencing proceeding is conducted before the jury to determine whether, in
light of the aggravating and mitigating factors of the case, the death penalty'
should be imposed.... Mitigating factors include, but are not limited to, all
relevant factors concerning the defendant's prior criminal history, mental ca-
pacity, character, background, state of mind, and extent of participation in
the murder .... In order to direct imposition of the sentence of death, the
jury must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating
factors substantially outweigh any mitigating factors.




the notion that murder deserves "murder," an eye for an eye, al-
ready exists. It would probably be ineffective, then, to insist that
capital punishment is disproportionate or excessive in all
circumstances.
2. The Role of the Judiciary under the Eighth Amendment
If the Court were to agree that capital punishment is by nature
excessive, it would be going against the grain of current popular
thought. Historically, the Court has been hesitant to nullify the
people's will as apparently expressed through the legislature, un-
less such will implicates specific constitutional prohibitions.93
Given the explicit textual authorization of the death penalty in the
Fifth Amendment,94 it is unlikely that a majority of the Court
would be willing to substitute its own opinion for that of the gen-
eral population. In Furman, however, Justice Thurgood Marshall
concluded that "[t]he point has ... been reached at which defer-
ence to the legislatures is tantamount to abdication of [the Jus-
tices'] judicial roles as factfinders, judges, and ultimate arbiters of
the Constitution." 95 He stated that capital punishment was "mor-
ally unacceptable to the people of the United States at this time in
their history. ' 96 Justice William Brennan agreed with Marshall,
stating that capital punishment "has been almost totally rejected by
contemporary society. '97 Brennan's and Marshall's strident decla-
rations of America's moral distaste for capital punishment were
proven misguided when thirty-five states reworked their death
penalties in the wake of Furman so as to overcome the Court's
holding.98 And the Justices' respective qualifications, "at this time
in their history" and "contemporary society," belied their certainty
regarding the prospective truth of their statements. They seemed
to understand the impossibility of a permanent judicial ban against
capital punishment on such grounds. Any Justice claiming utter
societal rejection of the death penalty would need to dismiss or
overlook its legislative persistence.
93. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (refusing to invalidate anti-
sodomy laws because their prevalence indicated popular approval and thus "dis-
proved" respondent's claim of a fundamental right to engage in sodomy).
94. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
95. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359 (1972) (per curiam) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
96. Id. at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
98. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. See also ELY, supra note 28, at 173
(calling Brennan's and Marshall's claims "nonsense" in light of the states' rush to
revise their death penalty provisions after Furman).
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Judicial. pronouncements like Marshall's and Brennan's in
Furman raise an issue not presented as clearly by due process or
equal protection attacks on capital punishment: the "proper" role
of the judiciary in assessing the compatibility of legislation with the
mandates of the Constitution. "Cruel" and "unusual" are semantic
Rorschach blots, open to varied interpretation. By contrast, "due
process," in its procedural application, and "equal protection" are
less amorphous and do not involve subjective judicial analysis to
such a degree. 99 Neither implicates the Justices' moral faculties as
necessarily as does the Eighth Amendment.100 The question then
becomes whether the Justices ought to follow their own moral
codes in evaluating punishments under the Eighth Amendment or
whether they ought to take their moral cues from the electorate, as
expressed through the legislatures.
Over one hundred years ago James Bradley Thayer argued, in
his landmark essay "The Origin and Scope of the American Doc-
trine of Constitutional Law,"10' that judicial activism - in this
case, the primacy of the Justices' own moral codes over that of the
electorate - denigrates representative democracy by rendering
the political process ineffective as a means of expressing popular
will.102 The "incidental and postponed control" which the judiciary
exerts over legislative acts was evidence to Thayer of its intended
secondary role in determinations of constitutionality. 10 3 The Fram-
ers understood that the judiciary would not be able, in all instances,
to invalidate "much which is harmful and unconstitutional" be-
cause the scope of its power to review legislation is "narrow.' 0 4
99. Under "cruel and unusual," the court seeks to determine whether a punish-
ment offends moral sensibilities that are not defined anywhere in the Constitution.
There is no resort to reason or logic. It is purely a matter of perception. Procedural
due process and most equal protection challenges, however, are concerned with the
rationality of legislation rather than its inherent moral acceptability. See ELY, supra
note 28, at 20-21.
[T]he questions that are relevant [to procedural due process decisions] -
how seriously the complainant is being hurt and how much it will cost to give
him a more effective hearing - are importantly different from the question
the Court makes relevant in 'substantive due process' decisions ... namely
how desirable or important the substantive policy the legislature has decided
to follow is.
Id. at 21.
100. During the debates over the Eighth Amendment in the first Congress, one
opponent of the clause asked "Who are to be the judges?", recognizing the inherent
difficulties of interpreting the clause objectively. TUSHNET, supra note 68, at 13.
101. Supra note 20.
102. See Thayer, supra note 20.
103. Id. at 136.
104. Id. at 137-38.
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The judiciary may review legislation only after its enactment and
only in the context of a true "case" or "controversy. ' 10 5 Limita-
tions on judicial power are desirable because if the judiciary can at
whim invalidate legislation that is presumably the product of popu-
lar demand, the people lose control of a government that suppos-
edly derives its authority from them alone. Elected officials, then,
should make their own analyses of a proposed law's constitutional-
ity. For Thayer, the judiciary should strike down legislation only
when "those who have the right to make laws have not merely
made a mistake, but have made a very clear one, - so clear that it
is not open to rational question.' 10 6 To leave all determinations of
constitutionality to the judiciary, on this view, is to shirk a sworn
duty to respect and uphold the Constitution.
If the judiciary abstained from invalidating legislation except in
instances of "clear" error, deferring instead to legislative determi-
nations of constitutionality, it would be giving the people carte
blanche to impose its will upon minorities. Suppose, for example,
that Congress determined that it is constitutional to require all stu-
dents to recite a prayer of their choosing every morning in school,
because the First Amendment, in its opinion, mandates only that
the government establish no single religion. 107 Those students who
eschew religion altogether or have "exotic" religious beliefs might
feel compelled to recite the majority's prayer in order to escape
peer mockery or more serious reprisal. If the legislature, as agent
of the popular will, is unmoved by these students' concerns, the
students can appeal to the judiciary's more "reasoned" constitu-
tional interpretation and have the Court invalidate the law on the
grounds that the First Amendment prohibits all establishment of
religion in public schools.'0 8 The Court espouses this understand-
ing of the First Amendment in the interest of protecting the liberty
of the minority against the will of the majority, even when faced
with contradictory public interpretation.
Alexander Bickel's theory of judicial review embraces this con-
ception of the Court as the ultimate arbiter of "true" constitutional
105. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S.
346 (1911) (holding that the Supreme Court has the authority to decide only matters
involving controversies between adverse parties).
106. See Thayer, supra note 20, at 144.
107. This interpretation of the First Amendment is not "clearly" erroneous. See,
e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-32 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that
nonsectarian school prayer is acceptable under the First Amendment).
108. See, e.g., id. at 585.
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principles. 10 9 The Court, in Bickel's view, is better situated than
the legislature to determine the meaning of the Constitution's pro-
visions because Article III judges are not subject to the vicissitudes
of political life. They are appointed, not elected. They need not
satisfy a constituency.1 0 Bickel assumes, of course, that appointed
judges do not receive their appointments for reasons in addition to
their wisdom and insight. Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous "court-
packing plan" evidences the falsity of this assumption."' The fact
that a Justice, once on the Court, might not turn out to be the an-
ticipated political ally does not negate this point." 2 Justices come
to the Court with well-formed political and social ideas and these
ideas inevitably affect their interpretation of the law.
109. BICKEL, supra note 20.
110. Bickel has stated:
Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to
follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government. This is
crucial in sorting out the enduring values of a society, and it is not something
that institutions can do well occasionally, while operating for the most part
with a different set of gears. It calls for a habit of mind, and for undeviating
institutional customs. Another advantage that courts have is that questions
of principle never carry the same aspect for them as they did for the legisla-
ture or the executive . . . . Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of
time give courts the capacity to appeal to men's better natures, to call forth
their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment's hue and
cry.
BICKEL, supra note 20, at 25-26.
111. FDR wanted to "pack" the bench with Justices who would give the Court's
imprimatur to his innovative, and controversial, New Deal legislation. The Justices
already on the bench at that time had regularly struck down both state and federal
legislation aligned with the New Deal's economic goals. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316-317 (1936) (invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act of 1935); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374
(1935) (invalidating the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550-51 (1935) (invalidating the National Indus-
trial Recovery Act). FDR's court-packing plan became unneccesary, however, when
changes in the composition and ideologies of the bench brought the Court largely into
FDR's camp. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-6, at
580-81 (2d ed. 1988). The Court then began to uphold New Deal legislation that
would have been rejected previously. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379, 400 (1937) (upholding minimum-wage legislation). The approved legislation in
West Coast Hotel was virtually identical to legislation rejected by the Court the previ-
ous year in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936).
112. Famous examples of Justices who came to diverge politically from the Presi-
dents who appointed them include liberals Earl Warren and William Brennan, both
appointed by conservative Dwight Eisenhower, and liberal Harry Blackmun, ap-
pointed by conservative Richard Nixon.
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John Hart Ely has criticized Bickel's approach to judicial activ-
ism. 113 In Democracy and Distrust, Ely states that Bickel's claim
that "our 'insulated' judiciary has done a better job of speaking for
our better moral selves turns out to be historically shaky. ' 11 4 Ac-
cording to Ely, there is no way of knowing if even the Court's most
celebrated moral judgments are products of their own standards or
only the result of exposure to outside pressures. 1 5 It is also un-
clear how the Justices are supposed to arrive at sound moral judg-
ments if they are not attuned to the morality of the society in which
they live. "One might ... question[ ] the alleged incompatibility
between popular input on moral questions and 'correct' moral
judgment."91 6 Justices may be just as likely to resort to their own
biases when faced with particularly contentious issues as are any
other government officials. In fact, they may be even more likely
to do so because their decisions are not subject to further review,
except for the occasional re-appraisal of their own precedent. 1 7
In light of these theories, it is perhaps not the Court's proper
role to divine America's moral position regarding capital punish-
ment when there is ample legislative proof that it is morally accept-
113. Ely would probably argue, however, that in cases involving "discrete and insu-
lar minorities," the Court has a special obligation to ensure liberty because the polit-
ical process would not. afford such opportunities. That is, minorities would never be
able to muster enough votes to overturn discriminatory or oppressive legislation and
so the Court ought to step in to protect their constitutionally guaranteed liberty inter-
ests. It is not a matter of finding "new" unenumerated rights for minorities but of
sidestepping a hopelessly uncompromising political process.
114. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 57 (1980).
115. Id (quoting McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opin-
ion, 3 Hous. L. REV. 354, 360 (1966)).
116. Id.
117. Explicit overruling of existing precedent is rare. There are famous examples,
such as Lochner v. New York/West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (fundamental right to
contract) and Plessy v. Ferguson/Brown v. Board of Education (constitutionality of
"separate-but-equal" doctrine), but they are few and far between. The Court is gen-
erally quite hesitant to question the validity of its own precedent for fear of losing
public confidence. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming fundamental right to choose abortion during
first six months of pregnancy). The Casey Court stated:
There is... a point beyond which frequent overruling would overtax the
country's belief in the Court's good faith .... There is a limit to the amount
of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior courts. If that limit should be
exceeded, disturbance of prior rulings would be taken as evidence that justi-
fiable reexamination of principle had given way to drives for particular re-
suits in the short term. The legitimacy of the Court would fade with the
frequency of its vacillation.
Id. at 866. In his concurrence in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953), Justice
Jackson wrote: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible be-
cause we are final."
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able to most people. In the absence of a flagrant constitutional
violation, on this view, the Court ought to assume that the political
process works well enough. 118 Even if one's position on capital
punishment favors abolition through judicial mandate - because
one finds it inherently cruel or incapable of fair application despite
its widespread acceptance - such abolition would have wider im-
plications for our system of representative democracy. It places
the ultimate power to make law in the hands of the judiciary rather
than reserving it for the people as represented by the
legislatures. 19
3. "Dignity" and the Eighth Amendment
Some have argued that the Constitution guarantees the right to
"human dignity. 12 0  This right, especially as protected by the
Eighth Amendment, would prohibit the government from impos-
ing any punishment that degrades one's basic humanity. Propo-
nents of this theory maintain that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments is predicated
upon the inherence and inviolability of human dignity, regardless
of one's criminal standing.12' On this view, the Eighth Amendment
makes no sense unless human dignity forms its theoretical core.122
The death penalty, from this perspective, violates the Eighth
118. This argument does not fail when applied to cases such as Brown v. Board of
Education, 347, U.S. 483 (1954), in which the Court struck down popular legislation.
The Court in Brown did not invalidate the "separate but equal" doctrine because of
evolving public standards regarding segregation, but rather because the Court found
that segregated schooling deprived minority children of equal educational opportuni-
ties in explicit violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 493. The Brown Court
did not presume to know what Americans really thought about racial segregation. In
fact, the Court was completely unconcerned with popular approval of its actions. In
Furman, by contrast, Marshall and Brennan sought to voice what they perceived to be
the people's true moral opinion of capital punishment, despite the prevalence of con-
tradictory legislation.
119. This point is related but not equivalent to the argument laid out in Part II of
this Comment.
120. See THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VAL-
UES, (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds. 1992); Margaret J. Radin, Cruel
Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1143 (1980) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment requires recognition of each citi-
zen's inherent dignity).
121. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Dignity, and the Death Pen-
alty, in THE CONSTrru-rIoN OF RIGHTS, supra note 120, at 145. Some Supreme Court
Justices, among them Earl Warren and William Brennan, have accepted the view that
the Eighth Amendment contemplates some kind of basic human dignity. See Trop,
356 U.S. at 100 ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man.").
122. Bedau, supra note 121.
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Amendment because it is inherently dehumanizing. But as the
Constitution makes no textual mention of such concepts, the adop-
tion of this position is entirely a matter of interpretive technique.
Originalists 2 3 - those who adhere to the "original intent" of
the Constitution as expressed in its black letter" 4 - will reject any
claim to a constitutional right to dignity. It is not for the judiciary
to "invent" the content of the Constitution's clauses; it may only
interpret what is actually on paper. If there is no explicit mention
of "human dignity" within the Constitution, or within the extant
documents of the Framers, one cannot pencil it in to arrive at one's
political or social goals. Doing so, according to originalists, com-
promises the integrity of the document and renders it meaningless.
By contrast, those who also appeal to the "spirit" of the Consti-
tution, rather than to its text alone, claim that the Constitution is
one of "principles" rather than of "rules."'21 5 It is thus permissible,
perhaps even obligatory, for the judiciary to look beyond the Con-
stitution's text and history to determine what its clauses contem-
plate in today's society. This methodology would not necessitate
that an adherent find a guarantee of human dignity within the
Eighth Amendment, only that he or she not deny it solely because
of its textual omission from the clause.
These two camps have spawned a variety of approaches and it is
rare to find a Justice who plants his or her flag at either extreme.
Justice Scalia, for example, is perhaps the most steadfast originalist
on the current Court, yet he has said that at times he would infer
extratextual meaning if refusing to do so would result in actions
abhorrent to our most basic notions of decency. 126 For example,
Scalia claims that most originalists would probably impute an evo-
lutionary meaning to the Eighth Amendment in order to outlaw
penalties such as public flogging and handbranding, which would
123. "Originalists" are also referred to as "interpretivists" and "strict construction-
ists" in legal scholarship and literature.
124. For a detailed discussion of this approach, see BORK, supra note 34, at 143-160.
See also Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
125. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993). Dworkin is perhaps
the preeminent proponent of the "constitution of principles." He believes that the
Constitution's very text mandates that it be interpreted broadly and abstractly. He
claims that "the [constitutional] rights that proved most important[, the First, Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth,] were written in very abstract language" and that such lan-
guage, "read in the most natural way[,] ... do[es] seem to create a breathtakingly
abstract, principled constitution." Id.. at 127-28.
126. See Scalia, supra note 124, at 861.
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otherwise be permissible if one looks only to original understand-
ing for guidance. 27
Even if one assumes the Constitution's evolutionary character,
however, Scalia sees "no basis for believing that supervision of the
evolution would have been committed to the courts.' 12 8 This asser-
tion combines textual and legislative deferrence in denouncing ju-
dicial activism. Scalia would say that because the Constitution
textually authorizes capital punishment, the courts lack the justifi-
cation to override legislative (popular) will by invalidating it as a
general practice. 2 9 In fact, the death penalty's continued existence
in the criminal codes of most jurisdictions persuades Scalia that its
imposition does not offend any "fundamental value" of American
society. 130 Justices aligning themselves with this view would be
quite unlikely to rule that capital punishment offends any Eighth
Amendment guarantee of "human dignity."
Furthermore, Justices amenable to extratextual interpretations
of the Eighth Amendment would not necessarily invalidate capital
punishment on the grounds that "human dignity" inheres in that
clause. 131 It is conceivable, for example, that the theoretical predi-
cate of the Eighth Amendment is not the inviolability of "human
dignity" but rather the right to be free of political tyranny. This
right is not explicit in the text of the Eighth Amendment, or in any
surviving historical document, yet it could be easily inferred from
other provisions of the Constitution, such as the First or the Fourth
Amendment. 132 On this view, the Eighth Amendment concerns
127. Id. at 861-62.
128. Id at 862.
129. For Scalia, it is "clear" that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit capital
punishment because the death penalty "is referred to in the Constitution itself." Id. at
863.
130. Id. As a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court, Scalia's recognition of the death
penalty's constitutionality has special weight. He is not merely a theoretician beating
his breast in some dim and distant realm of ideas, he is a practitioner who has daily
the opportunity to make the law.
131. It has been said that even if one concedes certain implicit values in the Eighth
Amendment, such "talk about human dignity ... is empty rhetoric and arrant non-
sense." RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME COURT'S OBSTACLE
COURSE 118 (1982).
132. These two amendments prevent the government from restricting political op-
position through censorship or warrantless searches of one's home to confiscate polit-
ical materials. Similarly, the Eighth Amendment could be seen to broaden this
freedom from political tyrrany by preventing the government from inflicting "cruel
and unusual punishments" on members of opposing political groups only. Today such
disparate punishment would be impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause as
well, but the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified almost eighty years after the origi-
nal Bill of Rights containing the Eighth Amendment.
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the political process rather than some more intangible, humanistic
guarantee.133
The right to be free from political tyrrany could, however, con-
template a right to one's human dignity, a guarantee "that all per-
sons are of equal worth insofar as the law is concerned, whatever
their variable merits and usefulness may be, and whatever their so-
cioeconomic or political status.' 134 A constitutional guarantee of
"dignity," though, does not automatically preclude capital punish-
ment. "'Dignity" is itself subject to varied interpretations. Perhaps
execution by particularly gruesome means offends one's dignity
whereas a quiet, painless death does not. 35 "Dignity," as a consti-
tutional guarantee, suffers from the same semantic difficulties as
other imprecise concepts.' 36 Accordingly, even if "dignity" were
established as a constitutional value, it would not be an invulnera-
ble ground for a blanket challenge to the death penalty. In sum,
the Eighth Amendment seems to offer little lasting comfort to the
abolitionist.
II. The Implications of the Death Penalty for American
Democracy
Because the Constitution offers no sustainable basis for abolition
of the death penalty, abolitionists must look elsewhere. The polit-
ical implications of capital punishment provide ample grounds to
deny the legitimacy of governmental executions. Much of the pop-
ular appeal of the death penalty results from ignorance of its impli-
cations for our system of constitutional democracy in favor of the
seductive, emotional rhetoric of politicians 37 and the sensationalist
exaggerations of the media. It is indeed difficult not to be horrified
and angered by the likes of Susan Smith, 38 Jeffrey Dahmer,139
133. See ELY, supra note 28, for Ely's argument against the death penalty on the
grounds that it unfairly affects certain politically disadvantaged groups.
134. Bedau, supra note 121, at 156.
135. One might also question whether execution offends or flatters the dignity of
political martyrs who are willing to die for their beliefs.
136. For a discussion of other semantically imprecise terms, see the discussion of
"cruel" and "unusual" in Part I.C.1.,'supra.
137. The Constitution grants the government the power to impose the death pen-
alty but sets no limits on the type or number of crimes that can be punished by execu-
tion. For examples of the increasing number of crimes punishable by death, see
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, supra note 14.
138. Smith was convicted of drowning her two infant sons by strapping them into
car seats and letting the car roll into a lake in South Carolina.
139. In Wisconsin, Dahmer was convicted of murdering several young men, dis-
membering them, and eating some of them.
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Colin Ferguson 4 ° and the Menendez brothers,'14 but neither in-
tense moral indignation nor justifiable concerns about personal
safety can overcome the political ramifications of capital punish-
ment. The death penalty is fundamentally incompatible with
American democracy.
A. The Social Contract as Source of Governmental Authority
A basic problem with the death penalty is justifying the govern-
ment's authority to impose it. Pointing to the Constitution merely
begs the question: it is like saying that the government has the
power to impose the death penalty because the government has
given itself that power. The standard answer to this inquiry has
been the "social contract." That is, the government derives its
power from a compact to which every member of society is a figur-
ative signatory. According to contractarian theories, the subjuga-
tion of one's absolute autonomy to the greater good provides the
source of the government's power to impose law and inflict penal-
ties. Law and punishment are necessary to maintain order and a
peaceful society.
The two theorists of the social contract who have had the great-
est influence on the development of our own political system are
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes, writing in the seven-
teenth century, claimed that "every individual always seeks to
avoid his own death, for each individual regards his own preserva-
tion as his greatest good.114 2 In order to ensure this preservation,
the individual has an "unconditional obligation" to obey the law. 143
For Hobbes, the surest route to death is absolute autonomy. Be-
cause humans are inherently selfish, they would fight ceaselessly
with one another in order to achieve their personal goals. Hobbes
feared that a lawless society would result in civil war, which is an
140. In New York, Ferguson was convicted of shooting and killing several people
on a crowded commuter train. Ferguson claimed in his defense that he suffered from
"black rage," the result of years of prejudice and discrimination against him as an
African-American. For an account of the crime by one of Ferguson's victims, see
Thomas McDermott, Are Executions in New York Inevitable?, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
557, 578-583 (1995).
141. In California, Lyle and Erik Menendez, adult brothers, confessed to killing
their wealthy parents. They claimed that their father had sexually abused them both
for years and that they had feared for their lives even though they were no longer
living at home. They were tried separately and each trial ended in a hung jury. They
are currently being retried.
142. JULES STEINBERG, LOCKE, ROUSSEAU, AND THE IDEA OF CONSENT 55-56
(1978).
143. Id. at 56.
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"unmitigated evil" as it increases one's chances of dying prema-
turely.144 The only means of avoiding such societal implosion is
absolute adherence to the sovereign will. 145 Hobbes lived under a
form of government in which execution was a given of sovereign
power. Hobbes argued, therefore, that in order to preserve one's
life, one ought to accept unquestioningly a political system in which
the sovereign may take life away.146 Hobbes did not demand of the
sovereign any guarantee of due process because he did not believe
that political power could ever be exercised unjustly. The sover-
eign was the source of all authority and thus incapable of illegiti-
mate conduct. 47 Hobbesian theories, then, do not adequately
address the problem of political authority in American society be-
cause of our rejection of absolute governmental power.'4 8 Hobbes
is important, however, as background for later conceptions of the
social contract.
144. Id.
145. Id. "And though of so unlimited a power, men may fancy many evil conse-
quences, yet the consequences of the want of it, which is perpetual war of every man
against his neighbour, are much worse." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Part II,
chapter 10.
146. Capital punishment was not beyond the scope of sovereign authority in Hob-
bes's contractarian scheme. One could not deny the right of the sovereign to inflict
the death penalty, but one could refuse to be the executioner either of oneself or of
another to whom one's relationship precluded execution as a matter of natural law,
such as a parent. This is not a denial of sovereign authority because there are other
people who can perform the duty who do not have the same problematic relationship
to the condemned. THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE 98 (H. Warrender, ed. 1983).
147. Hobbes believed that once individuals gave up their autonomy to the sover-
eign, thus forming the social contract, all sovereign acts were really acts of those
individuals.
[B]ecause every subject is by this institution author of all the actions, and
judgments of the sovereign instituted; it follows, that whatsoever he doth, it
can be no injury to any of his subjects; nor ought he to be by any of them
accused of injustice. For he that doth anything by authority from another,
doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth: but by this insti-
tution of a commonwealth, every particular man is author of all the sover-
eign doth: and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his
sovereign, complaineth of what whereof he himself is author ....
HOBBES, supra note 145, Part II, chapter 18.
148. Hobbes did concede, however, that "[t]he obligation of subjects to the sover-
eign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he
is able to protect them." HOBBES, supra note 145, Part II, chapter 21. While this
acknowledges the right of the people to depose sovereigns incapable of defending the
people against foreign invaders, or against one another, it does not modify his absolu-
tist stance regarding obligatory deference to competent sovereigns.
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John Locke's philosophies have been interpreted as attacks on
Hobbes' defense of political absolutism.149 Locke did not believe
that all governmental action is inherently just. For Locke, political
authority has its source only in popular consent. If the people ob-
ject to a particular method of governance, they have the right to
replace the governing body because the people, as individuals, are
imbued with certain natural rights that cannot be infringed or di-
minished on human authority. For Locke, the ability to replace the
government does not depend, as it would for Hobbes, solely on the
government's inability to protect the people.150 If the government
violates the natural rights of the people, they may seek redress
against it.
Locke stated that all humans are in a "state of perfect freedom
to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons
as they see fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without ask-
ing leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.''5 This
notion guarantees to the people a sphere of autonomy beyond the
reach of governmental authority. However, Locke did not find
criminal penalties, including capital punishment, beyond the scope
of sovereign power.' Violation of the natural law could justify,
for Locke, imposition of punishment that would not be justified by
mere violation of sovereign will. That is, people have a natural
right to their lives. If someone deprives another of life, the of-
fender may be punished, even killed - but the government would
not have the right to execute someone solely for cultivating oats or
breeding hogs because such action is within one's natural right to
livelihood and its criminalization would be an arbitrary imposition
of sovereign power. Even Locke's more "liberal" version of the
social contract does not preclude imposition of the death penalty
altogether, though it does set limits on the sovereign's ability to
impose it. This is the conceptualization of the contract that oper-
149. See STEINBERG, supra note 142. "Locke's political thought may... be thought
of as a response to Hobbes in that the latter argues that citizens never have a legiti-
mate right to disobey the laws of civil society and thus do not have a right to rebel
against civil authority, whereas Locke specifically attempts to justify a citizen's right
of rebellion." Id. at 55.
150. See supra note 147.
151. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
1967).
152. "Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station
wilfully; so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in competition,
ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be
to do justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the Pres-
ervation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb, or Goods of another." Id. at 289.
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ates, at least on a theoretical level, in the American political sys-
tem. Our government has the power to impose capital
punishment, for example, but only within the constraints of guaran-
tees such as "due process" and "equal protection," and only in
keeping with the prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments."
Nevertheless, the social contract, even in a Lockean formulation,
is troubling when used to justify capital punishment. The social
contract is, on some accounts, merely "the sum of the least portions
of the private liberty of each person. ' 153 As early as the mid-eight-
eenth century, political philosophers, such as Cesare Beccaria,
doubted that "the least sacrifice of each person's liberty should in-
clude sacrifice of the greatest of all goods, life .... "154 One might
question whether a sane person would willingly "leave to other
men the choice of killing him .... "155 In fact, the social contract
has seemed a myth to some. In the United States, it has been,
called a "convenient fiction."' 56
153. Id.
154. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 45 (Henry Paolucci ed.,
1963). This work was originally published in 1764 and has been one of the most influ-
ential philosophical works on crime and criminal procedure in the Western world.
155. Id.
156. Robert Rantoul, Jr., Has Society the Right to Take Away Life?, in MEMOIRS,
SPEECHES, AND WRITINGS OF R6BERT RANTOUL, JR., (Luther Hamilton, ed. 1854),
pp. 436-492, reprinted in VOICES AGAINST DEATH 34, 39, (Phillip English Mackey, ed.
1976). Rantoul was, at various points in his career, U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts,
U.S. Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. He was an ardent aboli-
tionist as well. The essay cited herein, priginally written in 1836, is an outright rejec-
tion of the death penalty. While much of his argument rests on political grounds, his
ultimate conclusion is based on religious conviction:
Not only has no man actually given up to society the right to put an end to
his life, not only is no surrender of this right under a social compact ever to
be implied, but no man can, under a social contract, or any other contract,
give up this right to society, or to any constituent part of society, for this
conclusive reason, that the right is not his to be conveyed. Has a man a right
to commit suicide? Every Christian must answer no. A man holds his life as
a tenant at will, - not indeed of society, who did not and cannot give it, or
renew it, and have therefore no right to take it away, - but of that Almighty
Being whose gift life is, who sustains and continues it, to whom it belongs,
and who alone has the right to reclaim his gift whenever it shall seem good in
his sight.
Id. at 40-41.
Rantoul also argued that we are parties to the contract only by "accident of birth."
Id. at 39. One could argue that continued habitation in the United States is evidence
of one's active and voluntary compliance with the covenants of our society's contract
- the laws of the state and federal governments - but people do not often concep-
tualize their lives in such a way. But see PLATO, DIALOGUES OF PLATO 45, 58 (J.D.
Kaplan, ed. 1950) (arguing in his dialogue with Crito that "he who has experience of
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If the social contract is intended to secure the life of every
"party" thereto, how can it provide that some may be killed? It
seems paradoxical that the very contract that pretends to protect
one's safe existence in reality jeopardizes it by refusing the right to
object to one of its underlying terms: the power of the government
to execute. Even if one accepts the social contract, it does not fol-
low that it would comprise the right to take another's life. If peo-
ple cede to the contract that part of their liberty necessary to
prevent others from doing harm to them, it would be sufficient to
grant only the power of lifetime incarceration.1 57 Given con-
tractarian assumptions about human self-interest, it is only rational
to draw the line at life imprisonment.
Though most people truly do not believe they will ever face the
death penalty, the surrender to the compact of even part of one's
absolute right to live gives the sovereign the power to decide the
circumstances under which it can revoke one's diminished right en-
tirely. While the courts and legislatures have generally conformed
to prevailing notions of proportionality, there is no constitutional
guarantee that the category of crimes punishable by death will not
expand.58 The broadened category could include crimes of which
many "respectable" people will be guilty. There is nothing in the
the manner in which we order justice and administer the State, and still remains, has
entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him"). That is, it
would be rare for an American citizen to consider residence in the land of her birth as
even a limited concession to the government of her right to live. Yet, under the con-
tractarian view, it is indeed so. Merely existing in a society signifies one's acceptance
of the terms of its contract, whether one knows them or not. But this acceptance is
itself a "fiction" as well because there is no alternative. One cannot effectively re-
nounce one's accession to the contract. Even an open rejection of its terms does not
render one -exempt from them. No judge or jury would even pause to ponder the
defense that one is no longer a party to the social contract and therefore free to do as
one wishes.
157. However, in some conceptualizations of the social contract, Rousseau's for ex-
ample, "every malefactor who attacks the social right becomes through his transgres-
sions a rebel and a traitor to the homeland; in violating its laws, he ceases to be a
member, and he even wages war with it. In that case the preservation of the state is
incompatible with his own." ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND Dis-
COURSES 35 (D.A. Cress, ed. 1983). However, Rousseau also believed that "[o]ne has
the right to put to death, even as an example, only someone who cannot be preserved
without danger." Id. at 36. Rousseau, then, seemed to reject both deterrent, in an
absolute sense, and retributivist theories of capital punishment in favor of incapacita-
tion. That is, capital punishment is justified only to remove a public danger rather
than to teach a general lesson or to exact public revenge.
158. The Constitution grants the government the power to impose the death pen-
alty but sets no limits on the type or number of crimes that can be punished by execu-
tion. For examples of the increasing number of crimes punishable by death, see
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, supra note 14.
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text of the Constitution that would prevent tax evasion, for exam-
ple, from becoming a capital crime. Many powerful people, deter-
mined to save a few dollars, might then be eligible for the death
penalty. Surely these people would never have considered them-
selves likely candidates for capital punishment because such penal-
ties had always been reserved exclusively for physically violent
offenders. But, however unlikely, it is still a legal possibility. In
light of this, one cannot assume that capital punishment is without
personal consequences for every member of society. The rules of
the game could change at any time.159
John Rawls's "veil of ignorance ' 160 illustrates this point. If all
members of society were to convene behind the "veil" to decide
whether to institute the death penalty, without knowing who
among them would end up facing it, it seems almost certain that no
one would agree to it, even on Hobbesian and Lockean accounts of
the social contract. 161 Capital punishment is acceptable only to
159. See ELY, supra, note 28, at 172-77, for a discussion of the political "buffer"
built into the death penalty to ensure that those in power will "run no realistic risk of
such punishment." Id. at 173. Ely argues that the Supreme Court ought to prohibit
the death penalty because our majoritarian political process almost guarantees that
minority groups will be disproportionately affected by it.
160. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-142 (1971). Behind the "veil,"
no one knows his or her place in society, or even what kind of society he or she comes
from. They are completely unencumbered by sociocultural baggage like economic
status, race, religion, sexual orientation, gender, age, etc. Rawls call this the "original
position." It is, more or less, a blank slate upon which people draw the parameters of
the society in which they will live. They do know, however, "the general facts about
human society," which include, according to Rawls, an understanding of politics and
economic theory, social organization and human psychology, and "whatever general
facts affect the choice of principles of justice." Id. at 137. Rawls's basic assumption is
that when we deliberate schemes of justice in the "real world," those in power are
motivated by selfish interest to maintain the status quo hegemony in which they are
supreme. In such an order, it is impossible to achieve "true justice" because the pow-
erful refuse to accommodate the powerless.
It is possible to argue, though, that even if we were all to convene behind the veil,
stripped of our former identities, we might not deliberate in the way that Rawls as-
sumes. Perhaps Rawls ignores the possibility that we, as humans, may be inherently
hegemonic and would construct hierarchies from scratch if we had to. However, be-
hind the veil no one has the power to subjugate others and the same inescapable self-
interest that skepctics might guess would lead to the creation of a pecking order could
just as easily prevent one. That is, if no one has the power to impose his or her will on
others, then people will strive to make sure that there are no inherent imbalances in
whatever societal scheme they create because no one will voluntarily accept a smaller
slice of the pie. For a more thorough Rawlsian analysis of capital punishment, see
Donnelly, supra note 68.
161. See supra note 160 for an explanation of why notions of inherent selfishness,
such as those of Locke and Hobbes, may prevent implementation of the death
penalty.
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those who are sure that they will never suffer for it. Tax evasion
will probably never be a capital offense because those most likely
to commit the crime to any significant degree are also those who
have the influence to shape the laws punishing it. Beccaria ac-
knowledged as much: "If we glance at the pages of history, we will
find that laws, which surely are, or ought to be, compacts of free
men, have been, for the most part, a mere tool of the passions of
some ... "162 The "social contract," then, is not a voluntary pact
but rather an imposition of oligarchical will. 163
B. The Death Penalty and American Democracy
The arguments against the contractarian justification of capital
punishment have special importance in American society because
our form of government is based on popular sovereignty. Our gov-
ernment derives its authority exclusively from the people. Such a
system presupposes the supremacy of individual existence over col-
lective government. 64 Government is not a fixture of nature; it is
instead an artificial construct with specific purposes and of limited
powers. Therefore, governmental authority to impose the death
penalty, which presumes the supremacy of government over indi-
vidual existence, contradicts the precepts of American popular sov-
ereignty.165 One's continued existence as an individual depends
162. BECCARIA, supra note 154, at 8.
163. Rousseau also believed that, in practical application, the social contract "was a
trick by which the rich were able to fasten their rule on the poor." Michael Lessnoff,
Introduction: The Social Contract, in SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 14 (M. Lessnoff, ed.
1990); ROUSSEAU, supra note 157, at 149-50.
164. While this is true of the American scheme of popular sovereignty, the contrary
is true in some other accounts of it. Rousseau, for example, believed that the sover-
eign could derive its authority only from popular consent, but he also believed that
once people band together to form a government, their individual identities are sub-
sumed and melded into that of a single political entity whose existence supercedes
that of any individual member. For Rousseau, no individual member of a community
can have any interest that is not shared by its other members because all citizens work
toward preserving the common good. "Clearly, then, Rousseau's formulation of the
idea of general will is intended to eliminate those inequalities which result from citi-
zens enacting law on the basis of private interest." STEINBERG,.supra note 142, at 86
(footnote omitted). This is in contrast to Hobbesian and Lockean formulations in
that the latter two view community as necessary to protect discrete, individual interest
from interference by others. Rousseau's idea of the general will, however, is not con-
sonant with American constitutional democracy, which is intended to guarantee cer-
tain individual, private rights and interests from encroachment and infringement by
others.
165. Traditional conceptualizations of the social contract, Locke's and Hobbes's for
example, do not take into account that individuals may belong to many groups, of
which the polity is not necessarily the most important one. They assume the primacy
of the polity as a defining characteristic of individual identity, that any accession to
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entirely on one's compliance with the government's laws. 166 Under
this scheme, life becomes a revocable privilege of American citi-
zenship granted by the government rather than a right inherent in
us as humans without whose consent the government itself cannot
exist in the first place.167
It is also striking that our government, as a collective of individ-
ual citizens, has a right which one would assume each individual
also possesses but does not: the absolute right to one's life. That is,
the government, in certain circumstances, may exercise complete
and utter control over a citizen's life but a citizen, regardless of the
circumstances, never enjoys such authority over herself. For exam-
ple, if a competent citizen commits premeditated murder of a gov-
ernment official - a sure-fire bid for capital punishment in most
jurisdictions - the government may execute her. But if a healthy,
competent citizen no longer wishes to live, she does not have the
right to end her life. 168 If a citizen does not have an absolute right
collective security is a wholesale commitment of one's entire identity thereto. Their
acceptance of the death penalty is evidence of this. That is, if we cede to the govern-
ment the right to kill us in the event that we violate certain covenants of the social
contract, then our identities become coterminous with our citizenship, if citizenship is
the benefit gained from membership in the compact. The traditional social contract
reduces an individual to his or her status as an American, for example, because it
equates breach of certain conditions of American citizenship with one's complete ob-
literation. It thus refuses to recognize the manifold quality of individual identity.
One may feel, as just one permutation, that at the core of one's identity is religion, the
race, then gender, then sexual orientation, then family relationships, then profession,
with "American" occupying some far outer ring of identity. To grant the government
the power to execute is to subordinate all other aspects of one's being to the fact of
political citizenship.
166. One might wonder how the government's power to send citizens into war fits
into this scheme. After all, people often die during combat, perhaps even expect to
do so in many instances. Yet, although the people have granted the government the
power to declare war and assemble troops, they have not granted it the power to send
citizens into war expressly to be killed. That is, death of citizens as a result of legiti-
mate combat is accpetable, but death of citizens as the goal of combat is not.
167. This argument, carried to an extreme, may lead one to question whether the
death penalty implicates the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition against slavery and
involuntary servitude. That is, if the government has ultimate control over our very
lives, then perhaps we are in some sense enslaved by the state. While such a radical
argument may appeal to one's philosophical faculties, it would almost certainly be
dismissed out of hand by the courts.
168. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 295 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that suicide cannot be considered a fundamental right,
in the Court's view, because it has been historically and traditionally prohibited);
Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir. 1995)
(finding that there is no general right to suicide under the Due Process Clause). The
Due Process Clause protects only those substantive rights that are "fundamental" and
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937). If the general right to suicide is not protected under the Due Process Clause,
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to her life, then how can she cede to the government the right to
take it away? This is not a religious argument, though some have
phrased it in those terms.169 It is a political argument: a citizen can
cede to the government only those rights which she possesses as a
matter of natural law because the formation of our government did
not create new rights but protected inherent rights instead.
The Declaration of Independence reflects this quite clearly:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.
Therefore, our government was founded to ensure these "certain
unalienable Rights" rather than to give rise to a new set of rights
dependent on governmental largesse. Our lives, liberty, and happi-
ness are ours because we are human, not because we are Ameri-
can. Being American, on the contractarian view expressed in the
Declaration of Independence, is simply a means of protecting our
natural rights against the will of other individuals.
The Declaration of Independence also states that "liberty" and
"the pursuit of happiness" are inalienable rights. Incarceration
would seem to violate the guarantee of inalienable liberty. The ab-
solute right to liberty, however, is the absolute right not to be
forced into servitude. 7 ° One can be jailed without being deprived
of one's absolute right to liberty because one retains one's basic
then it cannot be considered a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, which seems to imply that it is not a right inherent in us as human beings.
This, in turn, seems to imply that it is not a natural right. If it is not a natural right,
then we do not, as a matter of natural law, possess an absolute right to our lives, for
an absolute right to our lives would include the right to end it. If we do not possess
this right, we cannot cede to the government, according to the scheme laid out in the
Declaration of Independence. Of course, even if one recognizes this contradiction, it
is still unclear that it must be resolved in favor of abolition of capital punishment.
One could just as easily agree that there is an inconsistency and find that the proper
answer is that "we the people" indeed have the right to suicide and the government
indeed has the power to execute.
169. See Rantoul, supra note 156. Rantoul believed that because Christianity pro-
hibits suicide, Christians cannot cede the right to one's life to the government.
170. One might point out that there were indeed many slaves in the colonies at the
time of the Revolution. However, those slaves were not citizens for whose benefit the
Declaration of Independence and, later, the Constitution were drafted. While this
certainly changed over time, it took a constitutional grant of full citizenship to former
slaves - the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments - to draw them
into the fold of those documents' protections.
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rights, such as those guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, while in
prison. In addition, the "right to pursue happiness," a gloss for the
right to own property, cannot be fully alienated in our current
scheme either. That is, one may be deprived of particular material
things for particular reasons, but one's absolute right to own prop-
erty cannot be denied.
C. The Political Philosophies of the Founders
If we possess an "unalienable" right to life, how then to explain
the Constitution's textual authorization of the death penalty? That
is, if our right to life supercedes governmental authority as a neces-
sary condition of popular sovereignty, why did the same generation
of people who signed the Declaration of Independence proceed to
draft a document wherein that supposedly inalienable right is ex-
plicitly compromised? An examination of the legal history of the
colonial era, as well as of the founding documents, shows that the
apparent contradiction between the Declaration of Independence
and the Constitution was the result of pragmatism rather than prin-
ciple. The political scheme envisioned by those Founders striving
toward a unified nation differed significantly from that envisioned
by those who sought merely a loose confederation of sovereign
states.
The criminal law of early America was inherited largely from
English traditions. Capital punishment was an integral part of the
British system. Though in some respects our criminal law evolved
or mutated from its original British form between the time of the
first settlements and the Revolution, much of it remained the
same. 171 "Rather than being unique to the New World, then, the
institution of capital punishment in the colonies was merely an ex-
tension of an English legal tradition."' 72 The Fifth Amendment
was meant to guarantee to all citizens the protections of the com-
mon-law criminal and civil procedure as against violation by fed-
eral sovereign authority. 173 Thus, the Bill of Rights guarantees
such rights as the right to trial, 74 the right to refuse to incriminate
171. See RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 4-5 (1991).
172. Id.
173. See Lucius POLK MCGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 15-19 (1906) (stating that "due process of law" was universally under-
stood in colonial America to mean the common law).
174. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy trial .... ").
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oneself, 7 5 and the right not to be tried twice for the same of-
fense. 176 The pre-amendment text of the Constitution already pro-
hibited certain sovereign acts - ex post facto laws1 77 and bills of
attainder 178 - which had historically been seen by some as violat-
ing common-law due process guarantees. 7 9 The rejection of Brit-
ish "despotism"'180 did not necessarily entail a rejection of all
British legal customs; it required only that such customs be codified
through popular consent rather than by royal or parliamentary de-
cree. If the colonists sought self-government and freedom from
British tyranny, realization of those goals did not necessitate a
complete reinvention of the criminal code. The guarantee of due
process permitted the Founders to keep the baby while throwing
out the bathwater.
The Constitution also envisioned the federal government as en-
suring the collective safety and prosperity of member states while
leaving to each state considerable legislative autonomy to regulate
its internal affairs.'8 ' Under this scheme, the individual states con-
tinued to design their own criminal codes and practices. For most
of our history, state criminal proceedings were not controlled by
the Constitution.182 The language of the Due Process Clause of the
Federal Constitution echoed many state constitutions of the time,
which were offered as models for the Fifth Amendment and which
authorized, or assumed the legitimacy of, capital punishment.8 3 It
175. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself ...
176. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall . . .be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . ").
177. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall
be passed.").
178. Id
179. See McGEHEE, supra note 173, at 16-17 ("As early as the fourteenth century.
the idea was advanced, though only by the victimes, that a bill of attainder without
any opportunity for hearing granted to the person attainted was not in accordance
with the law of the land or due process of law.").
180. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
181. This conceptualization of the Constitution has remained constant over time,
but its application has changed as the Court has delimited state sovereignty differently
at different points in our history.
182. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states); Snyder
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (asserting that states have authority to de-
velop and implement their own judicial procedures and systems); Hurtado v. Califor-
nia, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884) (holding that the Due Process Clause did not require
indictment by a grand jury in state prosecutions for murder although it would for
federal prosecution).
183. See RODNEY L. MOT, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 152-53 (1926). New York,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Virginia all offered clauses from their own consti-
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is not surprising, then, that the Bill of Rights, which was itself a
concession to state legislatures as a means of assuring them that the
federal government could not act arbitrarily, reflects many criminal
practices of the several states at that time.
Other Founding-era documents that were not products of state-
federal compromise, being wholly of federal invention instead, of-
fer a different view of "due process" that does not contemplate the
power to execute. For example, the Northwest Ordinance (the
"Ordinance"), enacted in 1787 to lay down rules for lands ceded by
the states to the federal government, provides that "[n]o man shall
be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judgment of his
peers, or the law of the land... . "14 Regarding American Indians,
called "merciless ... savages" in the Declaration of Independence,
the Ordinance states that "in their property, rights, and liberty they
shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars
authorized by Congress .... "185 Notably missing from both these
clauses is the third element of the usual due-process trinity: life. 186
tutions that were virtual transcriptions of the thirty-ninth article of the Magna Carta.
Id. New York: "That no person ought to be taken, imprisoned or desseized of his
freehold, or be exiled or deprived of his privileges, franchises, life, liberty, or prop-
erty, but by due process of law.". Id. at 153., North Carolina: "That no freeman ought
to be taken, imprisoned, or desseized of his freehold, liberties, privileges, or
franchises, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life,
liberty, or property, but by the law of the land." Id at 152. Rhode Island: "That no
freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, privi-
leges, or franchises, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of
his life, liberty, or property, but by the trial by jury, or by the law of the land." Id. at
153. Virginia's offering was identical to North Carolina's. Id. at 152.
184. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, Article II.
185. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, Article III.
186. The Ordinance does mention "capital offense," however, stating that those ac-
cused of them shall be bailable unless "the proof [of their guilt] shall be evident, or
the presumption great." THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, Article II. It is unclear why
there is a reference to capital offenses in one clause of Article II when the "due pro-
cess" clauses of the same article does not seem to protect life against arbitrary govern-
mental deprivation. It could perhaps mean that the Framers understood "life" to be
protected by "liberty." The Ordinance, however, contains many other provisions that
seem to parallel the Bill of Rights. For example, Article I of the Ordinance guaran-
tees freedom of religion and Article II, in addition to due process, also guarantees the
right to habeas corpus, trial by jury, republican government, and the right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishments. If "life" had been understood in "liberty," it
would have been unnecessary for the Framers of the Fifth Amendment to include it
expressly. This seems particularly unlikely since so many state constitutions men-
tioned "life" explicitly in their due process clauses, including that of New York State,
where the Ordinance was drafted. See MoTr, supra note 183. Perhaps the drafters of
the Ordinance intended "capital" to refer only to the gravity of the offense rather
than to its punishment, as they had no way of knowing if any crimes would be pun-
ishmable by death in the territories. Section 8 of the Ordinance states: "For the pre-
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As the Declaration of Independence holds life inalienable, the
Ordinance also places life beyond the reach of government in-
fringement. The drafters of the Declaration of Independence and
the Ordinance differed from their constitution-drafting colleagues
in their treatment of slavery as well. 187 The Ordinance explicitly
prohibits it,188 while the Declaration of Independence had initially
done so until Thomas Jefferson struck the anti-slavery clause "in
complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never at-
tempted to restrain the importation of slaves and who on the con-
trary wished to continue it."' 89 It is plausible, then, that the Fifth
Amendment's textual authorization of the death penalty was in-
deed a capitulation to state interests that contradicted what might
have been a founding principle of the federal government."9
Thomas Jefferson was also a modified death-penalty abolitionist:
he opposed the death penalty for all crimes other than murder and
treason.' 9 ' These two crimes, he and other signers of the Declara-
tion of Independence believed, violated the social contract, causing
the perpetrator to forfeit the protections and benefits of citizen-
ship, among which was the right to one's life. 191 Today, however,
vention of crimes and injuries, the laws to be adopted or made shall have force in all
parts of the district .... " THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, § 8. Thus, the drafters did
not take it upon themselves to impose a criminal code on the territory but rather left
it to the future inhabitants to construct one.
187. The Constitution contains three concessions to the slave states: (1) the Fugi-.
tive Slave Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, which authorized the return of runaway
slaves to their owners; (2) the Three-Fifths Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, which
counted each slave as three-fifths of a person for purposes of determining the number
of representatives from the states; and (3) Section nine of Article I, which prohibited
Congress from passing any law outlawing the importation of slaves until 1808 at the
earliest. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
188. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, Article VI. "There shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." Id.
189. THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 33 (P.L. Ford
ed. 1945).
190. See the discussion of Benjamin Rush, infra note 198, for evidence suggesting
that perhaps some of those who signed the Declaration of Independence believed that
it contemplated prohibition of capital punishment.
191. Just before the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson drafted
three proposals for Virginia's constitution. In each draft, Jefferson proposed that the
General Assembly of the state "have no power to pass any law inflicting death for any
crime, excepting murder, and those offenses in the military service for which they
shall think punishment by death absolutely necessary: and all capital punishments in
other cases are hereby abolished. . . ." Thomas Jefferson, Third Draft of the Virginia
Constitution (1776), reprinted in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 359 (Julian P.
Boyd ed. 1950).
192. In 1779, Jefferson and George Wythe, who had also signed the Declaration of
Independence, collaborated with several other men in the preparation of a bill to the
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this is not the case. Even murderers and traitors retain the benefits
of the American "social contract" as guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.193 Jefferson also believed that "[t]he lex talionis ... will be
revolting to the humanised feelings of modem times. An eye for
an eye, and a hand for a hand will exhibit spectacles in execution
whose moral effect would be questionable ..... 194 The purpose of
punishment, for Jefferson, was not to exact revenge, but to protect
citizens from harm. Capital punishment should be used only as
"the last melancholy resource against those whose existence is [sic]
become inconsistent with the safety of their fellow citizens .... 195
This compromised abolitionist view was practical, given the virtual
lack of penitentiaries capable of holding long-term inmates at that
time. 196 If there had been effective penal alternatives, such as life
imprisonment, Jefferson would probably have opposed the death
penalty altogether.197
General Assembly of Virginia that urged the abolition of capital punishment for all
crimes other than murder and treason. See Bill. no. 64, A Bill for Proportioning
Crimes and Punishment [hereinafter the "Bill"], Report of the Committee if Revisors,
June 18, 1779, reprinted in WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 203-20 (Paul L. Ford ed.
1893). In the Bill, Jefferson and his colleagues argued that only murderers and trai-
tors ought to be executed because "it appears .. deducible from the purposes of
society, that a member thereof, committing an inferior injury, does not wholly forfeit
the protection of his fellow citizens .... ." Id. at 204. Jefferson seemed to believe that
treason was an especially abhorrent act, that "only those who swore loyalty to Ameri-
can Independence should enjoy the rights of citizenship .... ." LEONARD L. LEVY,
JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 30 (1963).
193. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality) (holding that
American citizens cannot be involuntarily stripped of their citizenship as punishment
for a crime) (opinion of Warren, C. J.).
194. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Wythe (1778), in 2 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 230 (Julian P. Boyd ed. 1950). "Lex talionis" is Latin for retalia-
tive, or retributive, law.
195. The Bill, supra note 192. Jefferson's view of punishment, especially those ex-
pressed in the Bill, were greatly influenced by Beccaria. NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR.,
IN PURSUIT OF REASON: THE LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 60 (1987).
196. See Michael Sherman & Gordon Hawkins, Imprisonment in America (1981):
In American criminal justice before the Revolution, incarceration seems to
be much less prominent than it is today. The jail was used to detain those
awaiting trial, when it was feared they might otherwise run away. It also
held offenders who had been convicted but not yet sentenced, and others
who were detained while obligations such as debts were settled. But major
offenders were rarely sent there as a sentence, and.., the practice of locking
up serious criminals in order to reform them through social services was vir-
tually unknown.
Id. at 79.
197. As incarceration became increasingly used as a punishment in itself in post-
Revolutionary America, on account of the increasing number and capacity of jails, the
imposition of the death penalty decreased accordingly. This inverse relationship has
been attributed to the reluctance of Americans at that time to execute criminals when
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In light of the fact that several of the signers of the Declaration
of Independence were opposed to, the death penalty, either
wholly 198 or in part,199 the document's designation of life, as
"unalienable" is not mere rhetoric, especially when the drafter
himself, Thomas Jefferson, expressed such views. In addition, the
absence of "life" from the due process clauses of the Northwest
Ordinance also suggests that the political philosophy of the federal
government generally opposed governmental deprivation of life.
The inclusion of "life" in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was likely the product of federal concession to state
pressure, in the interest of securing the ratification of the Constitu-
tion as a whole.2 °
there were other effective means of achieving society's penological goals. See id. at
82-83.
198. Dr. Benjamin Rush was a nother signer of the Declaration of Independence as
well as one of the Revolutionary era's most ardent abolitionists. His support of the
Declaration's provisions and his subsequent attacks on the death penalty, some of
which were published before the drafting of the Bill of Rights, suggest that perhaps
he, too, understood the Declaration to preclude the imposition of capital punishment.
Rush claimed in his writings that "[t]he punishment of murder by death has been
proved to be contrary to the order and happiness of society ...." Benjamin Rush, On
Punishing Murder by Death, reprinted in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN RuSH 36
(Dagobert D. Runes ed. 1947). Rush also stated:
Every man possesses an absolute power over his own liberty and property,
but not over his own life. When he becomes a member of political society,
he commits the disposal of his liberty and property to his fellow citizens; but
as he has no right to dispose of his life, he cannot commit the power over it
to any body of men. To take away life, therefore, for any crime, is a viola-
tion of the first political compact.
Id. at 35. Rush's claim that we do not have an "absolute power" over our lives was
not a matter of political philosophy but rather one of religion, as was the case with so
many abolitionists of that era. See id. at 36.
199. See supra notes 189-197 and accompanying text discussing Thomas Jefferson
and other signers of the Declaration of Independence.
200. It is interesting that the Treason Clause of the Constitution does not mandate
that the crime be punished by death, although even Jefferson would have approved;
providing only that "Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason
... ." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. If the adaptation for the Fifth Amendment of the due
process clauses of the states was a hasty, conciliatory gesture on the part of the feder-
alists, and if the Treason Clause did not mandate death depsite the history and accept-
ance of executing traitors at that time, then perhaps the death penalty was not seen by
federalists as a necessary power of sovereingty. It has even been argued that execu-
tion for treason is unconstitutional. See James G. Wilson, Chaining the Leviathan: The
Unconstitutionality of Executing Those Convicted of Treason, 45 U. PiTr. L. REV. 99
(1983) (arguing that execution for treason violates the Eighth Amendment because
the elements of the crime are especially difficult to prove and are open to
misinterpretation).
CONSTITUTION NOTWITHSTANDING
HI. A Political Approach to the Abolition of Capital
Punishment.
The Supreme Court can judge only the compatibility of laws or
practices with the provisions of the Constitution. It cannot ques-
tion them purely as matters of political philosophy. Reliance on
the determinations of the Court with regard to the death penalty,
then, cannot address the concerns presented in this Comment.
Political matters are properly the domain of the legislature. As
capital punishment contradicts the foundations of our political sys-
tem without offending the text of the Constitution, its abolition
ought be achieved through the political process. Resort to the leg-
islatures also forces the people to assume an active role in shaping
the political structure of the country. The Constitution is a public
document and the public ought to be responsible for its interpreta-
tion to the greatest possible extent.201
Neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Northwest Or-
dinance has the force of law, but we can draw guidance and counsel
from these founding documents in deciding whether to implement
the death penalty.20 2 The Declaration of Independence in particu-
lar has inspired many scholars.20 3 It has been invoked to argue, for
example, that slavery had been unconstitutional even before the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. The claims of inaliena-
ble liberty and equality among all people in the Declaration of In-
dependence have been proof, to some, that slavery was indeed
201. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 21.
202. Although the Declaration of Independence holds a special place in our polit-
ical history, the Northwest Ordinance is unknown to many people. It has been
claimed, however, that the Ordinance is as deserving of respect as any other Found-
ing-era document. See Denis P. Duffey, Note, The Northwest Ordinance as a Consti-
tutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1995) (argtiing that the Northwest
Ordinance ought to be considered on a par with the Declaration of Independence and
the Federalist Papers as expressing "the set of principles according to which [the
American] political community governs itself").
. 203. "Law ought to be seen to contain not only the means of striving toward ra-
tional consistency, not only the means of keeping the rules of legal decision in tune
with society's structures and relationships, but also the means - the methods for
reaching toward higher goals. . . . The two best sources for such concepts are the
Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution." Charles L.
Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in POWER AND POLICY IN
QUEST OF LAW 192 (M.S. McDouglas & W.M. Reisman eds. 1985). It is notable that
Black has also written a book on the "inevitablity of caprice and mistake" in the
imposition of capital punishment." See BLACK, supra note 18.
Ely notes as well that the Declaration of Independence is, in a sense, the theoretical
mate of the practical Constitution, calling the Declaration of Independence "Our fore-
most 'natural law', statement" and asserting that the Constitution is, by contrast, "de-
voted almost entirely to structure ...." ELY, supra note 28, at 89-90.
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incompatible with the Constitution because the latter document
comprehended the former's philosophies.2°4
Invocation of the Declaration of Independence is not merely a
crafty tactic cooked up in the halls of academe. The document has
indeed been applied practically. In a nineteenth-century case, for
example, the Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is always safe to read
the letter of the constitution [sic] in the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence." ' 5 Surely the Declaration of Independence has
not become, during the course of the twentieth century, any less
relevant or important a source of our founding principles. If the
spirit of the Declaration of Independence holds life "unalienable,"
we ought to interpret the Constitution in that light. The permissive
language of the Due Process Clause does not prove the legitimacy
of capital punishment any more than the Fugitive Slave Clause
proved the legitimacy of slavery.
Appeal to the legislatures is a tougher route than resorting to the
Court. It requires the consensus of millions of people rather than
just the five needed to achieve ultimate judicial success. The legis-
lative endurance of capital punishment results, however, from the
continued, erroneous belief that it is a legitimate choice in our
political system. An understanding of the implications of the death
penalty for our political system and for ourselves ought to spur a
critical re-evaluation, and ultimate rejection, of its place in Ameri-
can democracy.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding its textual authorization within the Constitu-
tion, the death penalty is incompatible with the American system
of constitutional democracy in which the government derives its
limited powers through express consent of the people and in which
life is to be held "unalienable." The death penalty contradicts
these principles by reversing the flow of authority, so that the gov-
ernment grants citizens a conditional privilege which they already
possess as a natural right: life itself. Successful judicial challenges
to the death penalty are temporary victories at best. The surest
204. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 892 (1986) (noting that
many politicians of the pre-Reconstruction era believed that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence prohibited slavery even though the Constitution permitted it).
205. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897) (finding invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause a Texas statute requiring only railroad companies to pay
adverse party's attorney's fees when they lose lawsuits).
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way to secure permanent abolition is through the political process.
As the Constitution merely authorizes capital punishment rather
than mandating it, legislatures have the power to abolish it com-
pletely. The American people must come to understand that capi-
tal punishment is in complete opposition to one of the most
fundamental principles of American democracy: the supremacy of
individual existence over collective government.

